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Abstract. Many African countries are both consolidating their democratic institutions and continuing to expand mass primary schooling. In this context, citizens may be interested in the broad
general effect of education on political engagement. Recent social science work estimating this
effect has not arrived at consensus, with researchers suggesting the relationship may be context
dependent, and could vary from positive to negative. We apply an instrumental variable (IV)
approach, using Afrobarometer surveys in Burkina Faso over the 2008-2019 period, merged with
data on the timing of school establishment at the village level. Individual schooling attainment
is instrumented by whether a school was established in the village of residence when the person
was seven years old. The data is finer than recent papers that estimate the relationship using
national-level quasi-experiments where education access changed across birth cohorts or where an
indirect proxy measure of education access varied across regions and birth cohorts. We find that
the relationship appears to differ by gender: men exhibit a substantial negative effect of education
on engagement, while women exhibit no sizable relationship. The null effect for women may be
due to low power, as there is less variation in education outcomes for women in rural areas. The
results suggest that gender may be an important mediator of the direction and magnitude of
the complex relationship between education and political engagement in polities with low overall
levels of schooling.
Journal of Economic Literature classification: I25, D72, O55.
Keywords: Education, Voting, Natural Experiment, Africa, Burkina Faso.
∗ We are grateful to Clément d’Haultfoeuille for insightful discussions at an early stage of the paper, to participants

at the Santa Clara University Economics Department seminar and participants at the Oxford Center for the Study

of African Economies annual conference poster session for helpful comments, and to Horacio Larreguy, and Pierre
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Introduction

The advent and spread of mass schooling in the 19th and 20th centuries coincided with the
movement towards open, democratic societies where most citizens became eligible to vote in free,
fair, and secret ballot elections. The two processes were linked, as educators incorporated civics
into primary and secondary school curricula, and as school boards were important local elections,
often with broader suffrage than elections for higher political office. Social scientists have thus been
interested in the relationship between the acculturation that children and young adults undergo
in formal schooling and their voting behavior and other expressions of political engagement later
in life, especially when significant fractions of the population are not literate. Intuition suggests
that the effect may be dependent on both the electoral context and the specific acculturation
that happens in and is associated with formal schooling. Citizens who are more educated may be
acculturated to view political engagement as an obligation and virtue of citizenship, but they may
also be more likely to engage in critical thinking, and take a “rational” approach to evaluating the
marginal benefits of voting relative to marginal costs. Moreover, political regimes and political
parties may make political engagement more or less rewarding for educated citizens relative to
uneducated citizens. To take an extreme case, one might imagine that in a political context where
power is exercised by a peasant-based social movement, book lovers learn to keep a low profile.
The acculturation and changed incentives to be politically engaged induced by formal schooling
may vary by gender, in different societies and in different contexts. Communities with social norms
that proscribe women from working outside the home or household farm may both discourage
their education and their political engagement. Indeed, many early democracies, such as the
United Kingdom, the United States, and France, limited the vote to men for more than a century.
While after independence most former colonies in Africa adopted universal suffrage, in practice
in most countries social norms discouraged women’s participation (Amoateng, Kalule-Sabiti, and
Heaton (2014); Tripp (2001)).
Estimating the relationship between schooling and political engagement, and how that link
might vary by gender, is difficult. Both schooling attainment and engagement may be influenced
by unobserved variables. For example, community-level norms might influence both individual
engagement and also individual schooling decisions. Localities with strong norms favoring engagement might also be strongly in favor of formal education. Communities more likely to be politically
engaged may also be more likely to provide, through collective action processes, opportunities for
education.
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There have, however, been several recent empirical analyses estimating the relationship between schooling and political engagement. Most relevant for this paper, André and Maarek (2020)
used individual-level data and dates of school founding to estimate the effects of education on
political engagement in Mali. Croke et al. (2016) and Larreguy and Marshall (2017) used Afrobarometer survey data to investigate the causal effect of education on political participation in
Zimbabwe and Nigeria, respectively. They argued that relatively unanticipated large expansions
of universal primary schooling (in 1980 and 1976, respectively) could be interpreted as natural
experiments. Other papers have used similar quasi-experimental or natural experimental contexts to estimate causal effects of education expansion on political engagement (Blaydes (2006);
Wantchekon, Klašnja, and Novta (2015); Dang (2019); Parinduri (2019)). The question has also
been addressed at an aggregate level using cross-country variation in experiences to estimate the
effects of education on electoral participation and a variety of attitudes regarding democracy and
political engagement (Acemoglu et al. (2005); Paglayan (2021); Diwan and Vartanova (2020)). A
number of papers have estimated the micro-level relationship by leveraging experimental settings
where levels of education attainment varied with program treatments in the context of randomized
control trials (Friedman et al. (2016); Kuenzi (2006)).
In this paper, we estimate the effect of education on political engagement in Burkina Faso,
separately for men and for women. We use five waves of Afrobarometer surveys collected in
Burkina Faso over the 2008-2019 period Afrobarometer (2021). This individual-level data is
merged with administrative data on school establishment from 1900 to 2004 and with geographic
data on the locations of all villages in Burkina Faso.
Burkina Faso may be a good setting to estimate the effects of education on engagement and
thus add to the growing evidence base. Access to primary schools, among the lowest in the world,
accelerated in the early 1980s. The political context over the 1991-2020 period was at the “semi”
end of semi-authoritarianism, with gradual and significant liberalization of political space after a
1998 social movement protested the assassination of independent journalist Norbert Zongo, and
especially after a street uprising in 2014 that ousted longtime president Blaise Compaoré. Women
have had both lower levels of schooling and lower levels of political participation (as measured by
voting participation and other indicators).
Since individual schooling attainment may be correlated with unobserved individual or community propensities to be politically engaged, we use the timing of school establishment in the
locality of residence of the individual, relative to the individual’s age, as an instrumental variable.
That is, the estimation strategy is to consider access to schooling as an instrumental variable for
educational attainment, in estimating the relationship between schooling attainment and political engagement, including voting behavior. As there are several respondents for each location
in the sample, each individual born at a different time, the method controls for likely persisting
locality-level relationships between local preferences of valuing schooling and local preferences
about political participation.
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We conclude, from the range of estimates, that the magnitude of the relationship between
education attainment and political engagement is quite negative for men, and apparently negligible
for women. As with most statistical analysis of observational data, there is a veritable “garden of
forking paths” regarding choices made by researchers (Gelman and Loken (2014)). We present a
range of results, and eschew selecting a “preferred” specification based on post-hoc results. The
sizable negative relationship for men may simply be an unlikely and possibly idiosyncratic artifact
of the particular sample, and the lack of statistically significant relationship for women may be
indicative that the statistical test lacks power. We find that the Afrobarometer sample for a single
country such as Burkina Faso (about 4,300 individuals observed in rural areas, with about half
in each gender, by design) is likely large enough, for estimation techniques such as instrumental
variables in a repeated cross-section setting, to detect reasonable sized effects separately for men.
For women, however, there is less variation in the education outcome, and so the statistical test
of the relationship is somewhat under-powered for relevant effect sizes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between
schooling and political engagement and Section 3 presents the context of Burkina Faso regarding
schooling access and achievement over time and democratic elections. Section 4 describes the
Afrobarometer survey and the school location data. The estimation strategy is presented in
Section 5 and the regression results appear in Section 6. Extensive robustness checks are presented
in several appendices. Power considerations are investigated in Section 7. Section 8 supplements
the analysis of the effects of education on political engagement with an analysis of the effects of
education on political attitudes and preferences. Section 9 concludes.

2

Schooling and political engagement

Formal education in most societies is designed to deliver both critical reasoning skills and a
bundle of attitudes, ideas, or memes that acculturate young persons. This bundle when unpacked
might consist of patriotism, civic virtues, idealism, nationalism, knowledge about history and
society, elitism, class consciousness, tolerance, respect for differences in values, etc. To these
might be added change in executive-level cognitive capabilities, psychological development of
feelings of self-efficacy, empowerment, and confidence. Some education programs are intended to
have a meta-habit of considering a variety of contradictory thoughts (ideas, or meanings) and
approaching decisions by thinking and evaluating them in the light of contextual knowledge;
that is, specific attitudes and preferences to be acculturated are not intended but rather are
emergent properties. Moreover, schooling is also about obedience and discipline: showing up on
time, completing assignments on time, taking tests, being quiet when the teacher is talking, not
questioning the teacher, etc. Because of the complexity and bundled nature of schooling, political
psychology does not have a set of presumptively valid hypotheses concerning the general effect of
formal schooling on political engagement (Basu (2002); Bruch and Soss (2018); Lieberman and
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Zhou (2020); Soboleva (2020); Wolak (2020)).
A complication in theorizing the effect of schooling on political engagement is the temporal
remove between the occasion of schooling and the occasions of political engagement. Schooling
occurs during a person’s youth, typically from age 6 to 18, and, for some, into university. Political engagement for most people starts after age 18, when persons become eligible to vote, and
continues through life, and indeed evolves through life. As Larreguy and Marshall (2017):p. 400
noted: “it is important to differentiate the skills and values learned at school (...) from downstream effects such as increased income, community interactions, and empowered social status.”
The suggested differentiation is likely more difficult than envisaged. Education attainment by age
18 influences the path of life experiences and lifelong learning of a person, which in turn influences
the person’s (usually) unobserved mindset as an older person (which is likely still influenced by
their mindset developed during their years of pre-adult schooling). The reasoning skills, and the
bundle of attitudes, capabilities, and ideas acquired during schooling presumably initiate a trajectory of continuity and change of mental habits, predispositions, and knowledge components over
the adult life-cycle. Schooling clearly changes, for example, the economic and social opportunities
for individuals. An effect of these changed opportunities is likely higher lifetime income. Higher
income levels may change the mental calculus of opportunity costs of engagement and preferences
for political parties who may have platforms that address the interests of different income categories. Moreover, age and life experiences produce wisdom (e.g., the common saying in West
Africa that when an elder dies it is as if a library had burned to the ground). The trajectory of
acquisition of wisdom is presumably influenced by schooling attainment. The capability and habit
of reading, for example, might be expected to change the wisdom of a person. Literate persons,
for example, have relatively easier access as adults to newspapers and books, which may be very
efficient transmitters of memes, thus shaping mindsets.
The underlying premise of some research has been similar to that of the “historical persistence”
literature: events that happened long ago persisted and left legacies in other time periods (Cirone
and Pepinsky (2021)). The “effect” of schooling attainment on political engagement is then a
shortcut phrasing for a process that may include many mechanisms. Education may have a
direct effect in changing attitudes towards political engagement, an indirect effect in setting a
trajectory for changing mindset during adulthood, and an indirect effect in changing socioeconomic
circumstances of adult life. Numerous other indirect mechanisms may be activated by formal
education: different networks of classmates, different urban migration patterns, and improved
access to professional occupations, each with their own acculturation processes. The literature at
present is unable to separate the various mechanisms that link schooling to political engagement
outcomes.
Most studies on political engagement include gender as a possible determinant of engagement
and find a gender gap in favor of men being more likely to participate than women, even though
the gap tends to disappear in high-income countries. Using the 2005 Afrobarometer surveys, Coffe
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and Bolzendahl (2011) found a significant gender gap in collective action engagement (attending a
community meeting and joining others to raise an issue), but no gender gap in terms of registration
to vote, in most of the 18 countries considered. Isaksson, Kotsadam, and Nerman (2014) found
evidence along the same lines; pooling the Afrobarometer survey data from 20 African countries,
women tended to be less likely to vote and to join with others raise an issue, the gender gap being
four times larger in the former than the latter. In the case of Burkina Faso, Ozdemir, Ozkes, and
Sanver (2021) found no significant relationship between gender and either voter registration or
turnout in Burkina Faso.
The question is not only whether women and men have different behaviors on average, but also
how to explain the gender gap and whether the effects of determinants of engagement are different
across gender. In high-income countries, the gender gap is mostly explained by resource endowments (e.g., education), employment, and differences based on religious affiliations. Using the
Afrobarometer surveys collected in 20 African countries, Isaksson, Kotsadam, and Nerman (2014)
suggested that clientelism, restricted civil liberties, economic development, and gender norms were
important drivers of the participatory gender gap. They found that the level of education was not
significantly related to the probability of voting in the previous election while it was significantly
correlated with the response to a question about whether the person had “raised an issue” with
others in the community. However the size of the correlation did not differ by gender. This result
is in line with additional analysis from Larreguy and Marshall (2017), who mentioned that their
instrumented coefficient of education on civic and political engagement did not vary by gender.
André and Maarek (2020) also split their sample by gender, and found that the effect of education
was no longer significant for each of their 10 measures of political participation.

3

Schooling and democratic elections in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) became an independent country in 1960, after more than 60
years of French colonial rule. Complex political machinations led to the election in the national
territorial assembly of Maurice Yaméogo as president prior to independence. Yaméogo then proceeded to dismantle open electoral competition, replacing it with a one-party state (as in many
other countries of the era). General Sangoulé Lamizana toppled Yaméogo in 1966 through a
bloodless coup, following urban unrest and strikes. There were several legislative and presidential
elections, and several constitutional referenda, during the unstable period of quasi military-civilian
rule that lasted 25 years from 1966 until 1991. In 1991, President Blaise Compaoré, who had taken
power with others in a military coup in 1983, initiated a gradual but apparently steady transition
to civilian rule. Compaoré retired from the military, and most leadership posts were given to
civilians. His semi-authoritarian regime was, however, backed by a strong presidential guard unit
of the military, and endured until a popular uprising in 2014. A brief transition government with
joint civilian-military leadership handed power back to an elected civilian government in January
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2016. A low-level insurgency that began in the north of the country has led to more than 1.5
million displaced persons by 2022, and disrupted the 2020 presidential and legislative elections in
several regions in the north and east. President Roch Marc Chistian Kaboré, re-elected in 2020,
was ousted in a coup d’état in January 2022. The coup was met with widespread apathy among
the citizenry.
For presidential elections, turnout during the Compaoré regime was fairly low: 25% in 1991,
56% in 1998, 58% in 2005, and 55% in 2010. Turnout was similar for national legislative elections held in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 (Elischer (2013); Santiso and Loada (2003); Loada and
Santiso (2002)). The 2006 countrywide municipal elections where rural councils were first elected
had turnout of 49%. The joint legislative and municipal elections of 2012 had a turnout rate of
76%. Turnout was 60% in the first post-Compaoré presidential and legislative elections of 2015,
with 3,309,988 voting out of 5,517,015 registered voters. Turnout was considerably lower in the
presidential and legislative elections of 2020, with 2,972,590 votes recorded for 5,918,844 registered
voters, for turnout of about 50%.
There has been limited research on the determinants of voter registration and turnout in
Burkina Faso. Ozdemir, Ozkes, and Sanver (2021) used original survey data to estimate the
determinants of registration and voting in the 2015 elections in Burkina Faso. They suggested
that socio-demographic variables such as income, education, and marital status were significant
determinants of voter registration, but only ethnicity was a significant determinant of turnout on
election day.
Burkina Faso had relatively low rates of primary and secondary schooling into the 1990s,
typical for former French colonies of the Sahel region. The French colonial authorities had little
inclination to spread schooling widely. Some factions in the colonial administration opposed
the Catholic missionaries who sought to expand schooling. The missionaries were constrained,
in any case, by the limited number of White Fathers taking up missionary work in the colony.
When Protestant schools started spreading in the 1930s, the Catholic missionaries often allied
with sympathetic administrators to slow the spread of Protestant schools. According to Maxime
Compaoré, as reported by Nabaloum (2012), the first formal non-Quranic schools in the colony
were established by French military authorities in 1898 in Bobo-Dioulasso and Boromo, followed
in 1899 by a school in Ouagadougou. Subsequently, schools were established in Koupela, Léo and
Koury in 1900, in Dori in 1901, in Gaoua in 1902, and in Tenkodogo in 1903. By 1920 there were
17 primary schools : 4 écoles régionales in Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Dédougou, Dori, 2
écoles de village à deux classes in Koudougou and Ouahigouya, and 11 écoles de village à 1 classe
(in Tenkodogo, Fada N’Gourma, Diapaga, Say, Kaya, Téra, Léo, Diébougou, Gaoua, Boromo, and
Banfora). In 1947, the colony had 89 primary schools. Of these 27 were private, and 10 were girls
schools. By 1960, according to Maxime Compaoré, the territory had 224 public primary schools
and 130 private primary schools.
After independence, the first presidents, Maurice Yaméogo, himself a former schoolteacher, and
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Sangoulé Lamizana, who had only finished primary education level (typical for ex-colonial military
officers), appeared to have been relatively uninterested in investing in schooling. Around the late
1970s, the groundwork for more rapid expansion of primary schools was laid. The military coups
and period of interregnum in the early 1980s were followed by the 1983 revolutionary regime of
Captain Thomas Sankara, who might have been expected to accelerate even further the expansion
of schooling. However, Sankara was opposed by one of the two important teachers unions, and he
fired more than 1,000 teachers in 1984, slowing the rate of primary school expansion from what
it might have been.
We use the terms education and schooling interchangeably. In some countries and regions,
religious schooling with curricula regulated by the government has been as important as public,
secular schooling. Burkina Faso has seen both Christian-oriented private schools and Muslimoriented private schools (écoles Franco-Arabes, madrasas), and so potential differential effects
might have been, and possibly remain, significant. However, the large majority of primary schools
have been and remain secular public schools in the entire country.

4
4.1

Data description
Afrobarometer survey

We use five rounds of the nationally representative Afrobarometer survey collected in Burkina
Faso (2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2019). The sampling design was in two steps. First, enumeration
areas were randomly selected, and then in each sampled enumeration area, eight respondents were
randomly selected to participate in the survey. 1200 respondents were surveyed in each round, for
a total of 6,000 respondents. For each of the enumeration areas included in the survey rounds, we
observe the name of the locality and the GPS coordinates. This enables us to match the localities
to the school list, and so determine whether there is a primary school in the sampled villages and
if so, the date of establishment.
The Afrobarometer surveys are repeated cross sections, and the sample is independently drawn
in each wave, so that the probability of observing an enumeration area in more than one round is
rather small. It turns out that we observe a total of 576 villages: 459 villages are observed only
once, 76 villages are observed in two rounds, 21 in three rounds, 20 in four rounds and 0 in five
rounds. If instead we use the GPS coordinates to define the enumeration area, we observe a total
of 578 unique GPS points: 500 are observed only in one round, 66 are observed in two rounds, 12
in three rounds, and 0 in four or five rounds. Figure 1 shows the locations of each village included
in at least one of the five survey rounds.
The analysis sample for this paper consists of rural residents only, and those born on or after
1950, leaving 4,520 respondents. We exclude residents of large towns and cities (the two principal
large cities of Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso account for about 70% of those excluded) because
respondents in almost all urban areas were born after school founding dates, which in most towns
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Figure 1: Location of enumeration areas included in Afrobarometer surveys, Burkina Faso
Source: Afrobarometer, five rounds (2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2019). Province boundary lines are shown
(45 provinces). As discussed in text, most villages are observed in only one round of the survey.

and cities were before 1940. We include the few towns that saw their first schools established
after 1940. The sample is further restricted to only include respondents born after 1950 in the
analysis sample.

4.2

School and village geolocations

The Institut géographique du Burkina Faso (IGB) provides a CD-Rom with the official list of
all village units (administrative and informal), the latitude and longitude of each, and shapefiles
for communes, provinces, and regions. There are almost 11,000 unique administrative entities
listed for the 13 regions, 45 provinces, and 351 communes (including the two urban communes
of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso). A commune is the French language designation for the
lowest level of national administration, and is equivalent to the old designation of département.
A typical rural commune consists of about 30 villages, with population of about 30,000 people,
usually with a central village as the seat of local administration (known as the chef-lieu).
Data on the year of school opening comes from a document, Répertoire des écoles publiques
9

Figure 2: Cumulative number of schools established in Burkina Faso, by region, 1955-2004
Note: The 194 schools established before 1955 are counted as 1955 in the graph. Source: Répertoire
des écoles publiques et privées du Burkina Faso en 2004-2005 produced by the Direction des études
et de la planification of the Ministère de l’enseignement de base et de l’alphabétisation (MEBA) in
March 2006.

et privées du Burkina Faso en 2004-2005 (called Répertoire hereafter) produced by the Direction
des études et de la planification of the Ministère de l’enseignement de base et de l’alphabétisation
(MEBA) in March 2006. The document contains a listing of 6,913 public and private primary
schools in the country, whether the school was urban or rural, the number of students and classrooms in each school, and the opening date of the school. There are no missing values in the
report for founding dates. The number of schools listed accords exactly with another annual
report produced by the MEBA on the number of schools in the country in 2005. It seems unlikely
that any established primary school, whether public or private, would have not been included in
the list.
Over the 6,913 schools, 85.5% were public schools, 7.0% arabic or franco-arabic schools, 4.2%
private secular schools, and 3.0% private Catholic or Protestant schools. There were six levels in
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primary education in Burkina Faso, but most rural schools only had three classrooms, with each
classroom teaching to two levels. In our data, if we restrict the sample of schools to the 5,447 rural
schools, in 2005 about 15% had six classrooms (a few had more than six), about 8% had between
four and five classrooms, about 50% had three classrooms, 13% had two classrooms, and 14%
had a single classroom. Over the period 1898-1955, 194 schools were established in the country,
while from 1955 to 2004 and additional 6,719 schools were established. There was a break in the
time series around 1980 when school establishment accelerated. (Statistical tests of breaks in the
time series at the national level and by region confirm the clear visual pattern.) Figure 2 shows
that the regional pattern of school establishment over the period 1955 to 2004 was quite varied.
Many regions did see acceleration around 1980, but some did not. Regions in the southwest of
the country (Cascades, Centre-Sud, and Sud-Ouest) and in the east and northeast of the country
(Centre-Est, Est, Sahel) saw fewer schools established in general, and took longer to accelerate.
Several core regions saw dramatic acceleration around 1980 (Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord,
Centre-Ouest, Haut-Bassins, Nord).

4.3

Merging the Afrobarometer, IGB, and school founding data

Appendix A describes the extensive data cleaning that was necessary for the school list to be
matched to both Afrobarometer respondent villages and to geo-coordinates.
We first merge the Afrobarometer data with the official IGB list of village names. We verify
that the latitude and longitude for those that match are reasonably close. There are a few choices
that must be made. Some of the Afrobarometer sites are listed as two places (literally “place1 +
place2”). We chose the first place if that matched and the second place if the first did not match
(records do not distinguish which place the person resided in). Spellings are not standardized in
Burkina Faso, and the many different unwritten languages mean that there are many different
spellings of place names. We used a place list concordance to match place names to standardized
spellings. We then merge the 6,913 school village names from the Répertoire to the 6,000 merged
Afrobarometer and IGB data. Again, there are similar issues.
Separately, we merge the list of Afrobarometer place names with the IGB list of place names.
That is then merged with the Répertoire. Then for every Afrobarometer place name and every year
after 1950, we construct a variable equal to the number of primary schools within 30 kilometers
of the village, weighting each school by the simple Haversine distance between the village and the
school. The weight for each school is the inverse of the distance squared. (We add 1 km to each
distance, to handle the 0 km cases.) This weighted distance measure is then merged back to the
Afrobarometer data for each respondent.
An assumption for this analysis is that a school, once established, does not close. It is possible
that there were schools that had opened and then closed, and thus were not on the list as they
were not used during the school year 2004-2005. Public school closings appear to have been rare,
and the occasional public school closing does make national news. (Since 2016, an insurgency in
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many parts of the country, but especially in northern regions, has closed several hundred schools
and displaced more than 1.5 million persons.) It is possible that some private schools were not on
the list because they were opened and then closed before 2004, since occasionally the government
inspects schools and declares some to be non-conforming with existing rules regarding school
facilities and instructional capabilities.
A better measure of school accessibility would take into account geographic obstacles (a forest
or river) that make it unlikely that a child would attend a primary school. The size of the schools
would also matter. As noted earlier, many of the first schools were simple one-room affairs, and
later schools were often simple straw shelters that shaded the students but offered little protection
from wind and dust. These one-classroom schools may or may not have welcomed students from
other villages. In some cases, even the one-classroom schools were under-subscribed as families
preferred to have their children continue to work. In other places, one-room schools were crowded
and pupils from other villages were not accepted.
In summary, we calculate two measures of access. First, we use the timing of the establishment
of a primary school in the person’s village itself. The “treatment” variable takes on value one if
there was a primary school in the village of residence when the person was seven years old (and
thus eligible for schooling). A second more complex treatment measure is the weighted sum of
schools around the village when the person was seven years old, where the weights are the inverse
of the square of the distance.

4.4

Descriptive statistics from Afrobarometer

Education The main explanatory variable of interest is education attainment. In the Afrobarometer, respondents are asked to report their level of education on a 10-point scale: 0 no
formal education, 1 some informal education, including Koranic schooling, 2 some primary education, 3 primary completion, 4 some secondary, 5 completed secondary, 6 some post-secondary,
7 some university, 8 graduation from university level, and 9 some post-graduate work. The left
panel of Figure 3 shows the distribution of the original scale.
We change this initial scale in two ways. First, we top-censored the scale because only 1.3% of
the respondents report a level strictly higher than secondary school completion. Secondary school
completion alone in rural areas also remained very low (1.8%) through the time period considered
in the paper (here completing secondary stands for the seven years after the primary school).
Second, even though the proportion of respondents who report informal education is sizable
(11.9%), we do not retain this distinction in the further analysis. Informal education in this context
refers usually to informal sites of Islamic instruction (often called maktab, kuttāb or daar ), where
students learn to memorize the Qur’an and write in Arabic. Students in maktab also learn the
hadith and of course life lessons from their imam. Our scale for education level is then a six-point
scale: 0 no formal education or some informal education, 1 some primary education, 2 primary
completion, 3 some secondary, 4 completed secondary, 5 some post-secondary, some or complete
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Figure 3: Distribution of scale of education level in Afrobarometer sample, original and recoded
for analysis
Source: Afrobarometer data, various rounds. Sample: Rural residents born after 1950.

university, and for some post-graduate. The right panel of Figure 3 shows the distribution of
these indicators of attainment.
We also construct three dummy variables: a dummy variable for having some education; a
dummy variable for whether the person completed primary school; and a dummy variable for
whether the person had some secondary or more.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for rural residents born after 1950, pooling the survey
rounds. The average values are also calculated by gender. The Afrobarometer sampling strategy
sought gender balance in every enumeration areas, but there are slightly more females than males
as we removed the respondents born before 1950. In terms of schooling attainment in rural areas,
about 32% of the respondents had some schooling, 21% had completed primary, and 17% of
respondents had some secondary. The mean education level was quite low, 0.75. Women had
lower schooling than men, in the sample.
As shown in Figure 4, the low overall average education attainment levels mask large differences
across birth cohorts. In the left panel, the proportion of respondents having done some schooling,
by 3-year birth cohorts, is plotted for the 1950-2000 cohorts. Men consistently were about 10-20
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample, according to gender

Year of birth
School before age 7
Number of schools, weighted by distance
Closest school distance (in km.)
Some schooling
Completed primary
Some secondary
Education level
Index of engagement
Voted in recent election?
Member of community group?
Participate in community meeting?
Join with others on issue?
Observations

(1)
All
1978.31
(12.250)
0.43
(0.496)
1.03
(1.802)
5.20
(6.418)
0.32
(0.467)
0.21
(0.411)
0.17
(0.373)
0.75
(1.259)
2.03
(1.044)
0.74
(0.439)
0.44
(0.496)
0.67
(0.469)
0.60
(0.489)
4520

(2)
Male
1975.63
(12.537)
0.40
(0.490)
0.94
(1.756)
5.92
(6.842)
0.36
(0.481)
0.24
(0.428)
0.18
(0.388)
0.85
(1.333)
2.29
(0.920)
0.80
(0.397)
0.47
(0.499)
0.77
(0.421)
0.71
(0.454)
2189

(3)
Female
1980.86
(11.400)
0.47
(0.499)
1.11
(1.842)
4.50
(5.897)
0.28
(0.450)
0.19
(0.392)
0.15
(0.359)
0.65
(1.176)
1.78
(1.093)
0.68
(0.468)
0.40
(0.491)
0.58
(0.494)
0.50
(0.500)
2331

(4)
p-value
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4520

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, various rounds, rural residents, birth year after 1950. Standard
deviations in parentheses. Participation in community meeting only observed in rounds 4-7. Final column gives
the p-value for t-test of difference in means between the two groups.

percentage points more likely to have had some schooling. The right panel gives the average
education attainment level, by gender and birth cohort. Again, the discrepancies by gender are
visible. For the sake of comparison, education attainment levels and completion rates in urban
areas, who are not included in the analysis sample, were considerably higher than in rural areas.
In urban areas, for the Afrobarometer sample, overall about 60% of respondents had completed
primary, and 25% had completed secondary. The proportions of respondents who had completed
secondary education went from close to zero for those born during the 1950s to 30% for those
born in the 1990s in urban areas, but only about 5% for those in rural areas completed secondary,
even in the 1990s.
Access to school The variable School before age 7 in Table 1 is a dummy variable taking on
value one if there was a primary school in the village of residence established before the person
was seven years old. Here the schools considered are either public or private primary schools.
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Figure 4: Rate for having done some schooling, and average education level, by gender and binned
birth year cohort, Burkina Faso
Source: Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents, birth year after 1950. Respondents
grouped into 3-year bins by birth year. Markers are sized by number of respondents; there are fewer
respondents in the early and later birth years.

On average, about 43 percent of rural respondents born after 1950 had schools in their villages
when they were age seven. The variable Number of schools, weighted by distance is the number of
primary schools in a radius of 30 km around the village of residence at the time the person was
age seven, weighted by dividing by the distance squared (we add 1 km to the distance so as to not
divide by 0). This is 1.03 for the entire sample, suggesting that on average over the time period
the typical person had reasonable access to school not far from their village (the number varies
considerably over time and by village). The average age of males was about five years higher
than females. Since women are on average younger in the sample, it is not surprising that the
values of these schooling access variables are higher. There are more schools proximate to the
village of residence at age seven of women than on men. Likewise, the table reports the distance,
in kilometers, to the nearest school. This averages 5 km overall, and is somewhat higher for men
and lower for women, again due to the difference in average age of the two kinds of respondents.
Political engagement

The Afrobarometer survey contains a variety of measures of political en-

gagement. We focus on an index that aggregates three measures of engagement. The measures
are: (1) did the person vote in the previous election; (2) had the person participated in a commu15

nity meeting (scaled from 1 to 4); and (3) whether the person met with other persons to raise an
issue. The two questions about participating were: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes
take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of
these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Got together
with others to raise an issue? Attended a community meeting?. The participation questions are
recoded to be dummy variables.
The question of whether the respondent voted in an election referred to the last election
that took place before each survey round. In round 4 (2008), individuals were asked about the
legislative elections of May 2007; in round 5 (2012) about the presidential elections of November
2010; in round 6 (2015) about the legislative and municipal elections of 2012; and in rounds 7 and
8 (2018 and 2019) about the presidential and legislative elections of 2015. The question had a
large number of possible responses, ranging from the person being too young to vote, to not having
registered to vote, to having decided not to vote, to not finding the polling station, to actually
voting. We have recoded the answers to be a simple dummy variable for whether the person
voted. If the person indicated in response that they were too young to vote, and the person’s age
was 21 or younger at the time of the survey, we have recoded that variable as missing, since the
question is not pertinent. If they said they were too young to vote but they were older than 21 at
the time of the survey, we have recoded them as not voting. About 130 (or 3.7% of respondents
in the analysis sample) were indeed too young to have voted.
The index of engagement is the simple sum of the three dummy variables.
In addition, we shall also examine a question about the extent of membership in a community
group (scaled from 1 to 4), that was asked in rounds 4-7 but not in round 8. The question about
membership in a community group was as follows: Let’s turn to your role in the community. Now
I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell
me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member:
Member of voluntary association or community group. This membership question is also recoded
to be a dummy variable.
About 74% of respondents (who were not too young to vote) in rural areas said they had voted
(see Table 1). There is little variation over time. 76% of the respondents said they had voted in
round 4, 72% in round 5, 73% in round 6 and 74.5% in rounds 7 and 8. Other forms of political
engagement were less common. Overall, about 67% said they had participated in a community
meeting; 60% said they had “joined with others to discuss an issue”; and 44% of respondents said
they were members of a community group (this question is only available in rounds 4 to 7, not
in round 8). Men were much more politically engaged than women, by these measures, for the
sample respondents.
Graphical relationship between education and political engagement behavior Figure 5 shows
graphically that education level is negatively correlated with the index of engagement, for both
women and men, if one does not control for any confounds. The plot displays the mean index of
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Figure 5: Mean of index of political engagement by gender, according to mean education level,
by birth cohort, Burkina Faso
Source: Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents only. Respondents grouped by birth year.
There are fewer respondents in the early and later birth years. Select markers are labelled by birth
cohort.

engagement according to the mean education level in each birth year cohort. As can be seen, the
different birth cohorts have very different mean levels of education, and also different mean levels
of the index of engagement. Women have lower levels of education and lower levels of political
engagement.
There are several possible confounds in Figure 5 that are important to recall. First, mean
education levels for the cohort is closely correlated with the birth year of the cohort. Older
generations are on average less educated, as seen earlier in Figure 4. Different birth cohorts have
more than just differences in education affecting their propensity to be civically engaged. Older
people may have attained greater civic-mindedness by virtue of their life experiences, on average,
and so may be more motivated to be politically engaged. Second, the round of the Afrobarometer
survey is not controlled for, and even though the overall turnout levels are rather similar over
time, the composition of the voters might differ across different elections. Third, education is
endogenous and may be correlated with propensity to be politically engaged, and so the estimate
of the relationship (here simply a visual relationship) may be biased. It may be that education
17

is associated with more engagement, but education is also positively associated with a third
variable associated with less engagement. Or education may be negatively associated with a third
variable associated with more engagement. For example, larger villages might have more education
and education might induce more people to be engaged, but larger villages have something else
about them that induces lower engagement. Education attainment may be correlated with time
preference or a variety of cognitive capabilities or dispositions, and these may be correlated with
a propensity to be politically engaged. These various confounds may vary by gender.
An instrumental variables approach with geographic and birth cohort dummy variables might
be more credible in estimating the causal effect of education on political engagement. The remainder of the paper explores the issue of determining whether the substantial variation in political
engagement is plausibly attributed to the effects of attending school (and perhaps having been
differently acculturated and having different economic and social opportunities).

5

Estimation strategy

We wish to estimate an average causal effect of educational attainment on the propensity to be
politically engaged in Burkina Faso. How much more or less engaged are female and male citizens
who have attained higher levels of schooling?
Let Y be the index of political engagement (or alternatively the various components of the
index, such as having voted in a recent election, having joined with others to raise an issue,
or having joined a community group). Let E be a measure of education attainment. E may
be measured in several ways: (1) having been enrolled in primary school; (2) having completed
primary school; (3) number of years of education completed, etc.
If education were randomly distributed across individuals, we could estimate the average effect
of education on political engagement using the following model:
Yitv = α + βEitv + γXitv + εitv

(1)

We observe Y , E, and X, for each individual i born in year t living in village v. X includes a set
of covariates, such as dummy variables indicating survey rounds. Each survey makes reference to
a different election and this may matter in the individual decision to be politically engaged. We
create a binary variable taking value one if the respondent is surveyed after the ouster in 2014 of
President Blaise Compaoré and zero otherwise. We estimate the regressions separately for men
and for women.
Schooling attainment is evidently not randomly distributed across the population, and likely to
be associated with unobserved personal, family, village, and generational characteristics that might
also determine political engagement. We therefore adopt an instrumental variable (IV) estimation
strategy to correct for likely omitted variable bias. Following the lead of other researchers, we use
school establishment as an IV for educational attainment (see Card (1995); Card (1999); Currie
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and Moretti (2003); Duflo (2001) for the pioneering approaches, and André and Maarek (2020)
for similar estimation using data from neighbouring Mali).
The main instrumental variable, denoted by Z, is a binary variable that takes value one if
the respondent lives in a village where there was a school when she was eligible for school (i.e.
seven years old), and zero if the respondent lives in a village where there was no school when
she was of school-age. We also use as IV the number of primary schools around the village, each
school weighted by the inverse of the square of distance from the village. The Afrobarometer
data unfortunately does not include place of birth or childhood, so current residence is used
as a proxy for location during schooling years. Data on migration status is not collected in the
Afrobarometer. The self-selection concern is reasonable: perhaps individuals or parents who desire
high education attainment move to village shortly after a school is established, thus the educated
in a village are different for other reasons compared with those in the village just before the school
was established. The bias introduced may not be large, however. Burkina Faso historically had
very low migration rates compared with other countries. Furthermore, we restrict our sample
to the rural respondents, so the estimates may not suffer from the bias that would arise due to
rural-urban migration.
The normal instrumental variable model estimated, expressed as a two-stage model, is:


 Eitv = φ + θZtv + πXitv + νitv



(2)

bitv + γXitv + εitv
Yitv = α + β E

For the identification approach to be valid, the instrumental variable has to be correlated with
the level of education and not correlated with the error term of the second-stage equation ε. The
first correlation is discussed when presenting the results from the first-stage estimations in Section
6.1. The second requirement is the exclusion restriction: the instrument should have no effect on
the outcome other than through the first-stage channel. The exclusion restriction is conditional
on all covariates, and does not assume the unconditional orthogonality of the instrument and the
outcome. It is therefore important to control for community-level variables to account for possible
endogenous placement of the schools and variation across cohorts as education levels increased
over time. All of the regressions will control for location dummies, alternatively defined to be at
the commune or province levels, and year of birth dummies, either as annual dummies or five-year
birth cohort dummies. Ideally the location dummy variables would be at the village level and
the birth cohort would be an the annual level, but as noted earlier there are, for most villages,
only 8 observations per village, and so few respondents “straddle” the treatment of being of school
age before and after the establishment of the school. We return to this issue below. The actual
estimation we perform then is given by equation (3):

19



 Eitvl = φ + θZtvl + πXitvl + δt + θl + νitvl



Yitvl

(3)

bitvl + γXitv + δt + θl + εitvl
= α + βE

where we observe Y , E, Z, and X, for each individual i born in year t living in village v
located in locality l (commune or province). We therefore exploit two sources of variation: birth
cohort and location. We observe within-birth cohort variation as people from the same cohort had
different access to primary schools as they lived in different locations. We observe within-location
variation as people from a given location are from different birth cohorts, and some were too old
to benefit from school construction, while others were of school age or were born after the school
was built and thus had access to the school.
Marshall (2016) suggested that the use of a continuous measure of education such as number of
years of education or highest education level would be preferred over the use of a binary variable
that would capture a particular level of education (e.g. having completed primary school, or
secondary school). The policy reform or the construction of new school induces children to go
to school and their enrolment in primary school then conditions their likelihood of pursuing each
additional year of education. As a result, one could argue that the construction of primary school
has an effect not only on the propensity to be enrolled in primary school but also in higher levels
of education. Thus the exclusion restriction is not satisfied if we restrict the measure of education
to having attended or completed primary school, because the construction of the school affects
political engagement by other channels than just completing primary (i.e. by continuing on to
secondary).
However a drawback of restricting attention to continuous measures, given the data we have,
is that using the education level assumes that any one-unit increase in education induces a rise or
decrease in the probability of political participation by β percentage point. For instance everything
else being equal, the difference between those who have no education and those who attended
without completing primary school is equal to the difference between those who attended without
completing secondary school and those who had completed secondary school. This assumption
is rather strong, and we thus consider both the continuous education attainment variable and
several binary education outcomes.
Our first-stage equation being close to a difference-in-difference equation, this estimation strategy had been labelled ‘instrumented difference in differences’ (DDIV) by Hudson, Hull, and Liebersohn (2017). DDIV estimates reflect the impact of education attainment on the final outcomes
for the individuals who would not have attained much schooling had access remained difficult in
their locality. It is an estimate of the average response of those who are treated. In other words
it consists in a IV strategy where the first-stage equation relies on a difference-in-difference style
estimator of the effect of the treatment on the endogenous variable.
Duflo (2001) is a key example of the DDIV approach. She estimated the income returns to
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education. She argued that children in localities in Indonesia who were eligible to attend primary
school after the INPRES school expansion program were more likely to reach a higher level of
educational attainment than the children in older cohorts. Since most primary school programs
group children by age in classes, and social stigma for older children from being in classes with
much younger children is high, older children were less likely to benefit from newly constructed
primary schools located in their district. While school construction was likely not random, Duflo
argued that the timing of the school construction program relative to the age of any particular
child was likely to be as good as random. Duflo used a treatment variable aggregated at the district
level, making the implicit assumption that the construction program was uniformly distributed
within each district.
Several researchers interested in the question of the effects of education on political engagement have implemented estimation strategies similar to Duflo’s DDIV strategy. Larreguy and
Marshall (2017) examined the Universal Primary Education policy reform (and accompanying
secondary school construction program) to extend free schooling to all children in Nigeria in 1976.
Other researchers have used a simple difference strategy at the national level; i.e. when a country
changes education policy in a way that affects all students across the country, the cohort affected
has different outcomes from the cohort that was too old to benefit from the policy change. In
particular, Croke et al. (2016) used a regression discontinuity equation for the first stage regression. They examined the effects of reforms undertaken in Zimbabwe in 1980 to extend schooling
access to black residents (after the end of white rule). André and Maarek (2020) estimated the
effects of schooling with a very similar setup as ours, using data from Mali.

6
6.1

Results
Effects of school establishment on schooling outcomes

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of relevant variables where
respondents are grouped according to whether they were of age to be eligible for school (seven
years old) before or after a school was established in their village of residence. This variable is
the main “treatment” variable in the analysis. Treated respondents are those for whom there
was a school, when they were seven years old, in their village of current residence. The table
makes clear that treated respondents, both women and men, had substantially larger education
outcomes; primary completion rates, for example, were 29% compared with 11% for women, and
40% compared to 14% for men. Engagement outcomes also differed, again both for women and for
men. Those of school age after a school was established scored lower on the engagement index:,
1.68 compared with 1.87 for women, and 2.15 compared with 2.39 for men. All of the components
of the index were similarly lower, for both men and women (not reported). Those treated were less
likely to vote, less likely to participate in a community meeting, and less likely to join with others
to discuss a problem. Also, those educated were less likely to be a member of a community group.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of sample, according to whether school eligible after or before school
established, according to gender
(1)
All

(2)
School exists
when age 7

(3)
No school
when age 7

(4)
p-value

Panel A: Women
Some schooling
Completed primary
Some secondary
Education attainment
Index of engagement
Observations

0.28
(0.450)
0.19
(0.392)
0.15
(0.359)
0.65
(1.176)
1.78
(1.093)
2331

0.41
(0.492)
0.29
(0.455)
0.24
(0.427)
0.98
(1.355)
1.68
(1.096)
1065

0.18
(0.384)
0.11
(0.310)
0.08
(0.271)
0.38
(0.925)
1.87
(1.083)
1215

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
2280

Panel B: Men
Some schooling
Completed primary
Some secondary
Education attainment
Index of engagement
Observations

0.36
(0.481)
0.24
(0.428)
0.18
(0.388)
0.85
(1.333)
2.29
(0.920)
2189

0.56
(0.497)
0.40
(0.490)
0.32
(0.468)
1.41
(1.548)
2.15
(0.991)
866

0.24
(0.427)
0.14
(0.348)
0.10
(0.294)
0.50
(1.024)
2.39
(0.859)
1309

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
2175

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, various rounds, rural residents, birth year after 1950. Standard
deviations in parentheses. Final column gives the p-value for t-test of difference in means between the two groups.

The differences in average outcomes do not, however, account for cohort effects. Respondents
born after schools were established are of course on average younger, by about 12 years. Neither
do the simple differences in means account for geographic differences and survey round effects.
We turn, then, to multivariable regression analysis. We examine first the magnitude of the
relationship at the individual level between education attainment and being “treated.” We have
two different measures for being treated. One is there being a school established in the village of
current residence when the respondent was of an age eligible for schooling, which we set at seven
years old. The other is the number of schools around the village when the respondent was age
seven, each weighted by the inverse of the square of the distance from the school to the village.
Tables 3 and 4 present in a compact display the regression coefficients of interest for a variety
of specifications and for four outcome variables, for men only and then for women only. Standard
errors in all specifications are clustered at the village level. The four outcome variables are a
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Table 3: Effects of school in village or near village, when individual of school age, on education
outcomes, various specifications, men only
(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.322∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.249∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.218∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.136∗∗∗
(0.043)

0.259∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.190∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.169∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.096∗∗
(0.040)

0.229∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.151∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.136∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.057
(0.038)

0.924∗∗∗
(0.076)
0.695∗∗∗
(0.078)
0.618∗∗∗
(0.079)
0.369∗∗∗
(0.125)

Panel B: Number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.083∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.070∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.071∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.032∗∗∗
(0.012)

0.076∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.061∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.061∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.021∗∗
(0.010)

0.071∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.052∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.027∗∗∗
(0.010)

0.262∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.212∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.214∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.075∗∗
(0.030)

Notes: Each coefficient and standard error in the table is for a separate regression, according to the specification
(row) and outcome measure (column) and measure of schooling access (panel). For Panel A the coefficient is that
of the dummy variable indicating if a school was present, for Panel B the coefficient is on the variable representing
the count of schools, each weighted by the inverse distance squared, where distance is the measure in kilometers of
the distance from the village of residence to the village of the school. Standard errors, clustered at the village
level, are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command reghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01. Data is from Afrobarometer survey,
Burkina Faso, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, men only, and administrative data on year of school
establishment.

binary variable for whether the person had some formal education, a binary for having completed
primary school, and a binary variable for having attended at least some years of secondary school,
and lastly the scale of schooling attainment, ranging from 0 to 5 as displayed in Figure 3. All
specifications include a dummy variable for whether the respondent is surveyed during one of the
post-Compaoré rounds.
We refer to the specifications as: (1) No cohort or locality dummy variables; (2) Birth year
cohort and province dummy variables; (3) Five-year birth cohort and commune dummies; (4) Birth
year cohort and village dummy variables. The specifications differ in terms of the geographic
and birth year dummy variables that control for unobserved correlates. Dummy variables for
geographic areas may be at the commune level (for the 209 communes in the data, the median
number of respondents is 16, while the minimum is 5 respondents) or at the province level (45
clusters with median size of 99 respondents). We can also use the village level as the geographic
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Table 4: Effects of school in village or near village, when individual of school age, on education
outcomes, various specifications, women only
(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.238∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.175∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.126∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.003
(0.038)

0.187∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.131∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.081∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.025
(0.033)

0.162∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.103∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.037
(0.031)

0.618∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.429∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.273∗∗∗
(0.068)
-0.060
(0.097)

Panel B: Number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.064∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.052∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.048∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.016∗
(0.009)

0.054∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.045∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.014
(0.011)

0.048∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.040∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.024∗
(0.013)

0.177∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.146∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.140∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.060∗
(0.033)

Notes: Each coefficient and standard error in the table is for a separate regression, according to the specification
(row) and outcome measure (column) and measure of schooling access (panel). For Panel A the coefficient is that
of the dummy variable indicating if a school was present, for Panel B the coefficient is on the variable representing
the count of schools, each weighted by the inverse distance squared, where distance is the measure in kilometers of
the distance from the village of residence to the village of the school. Standard errors, clustered at the village
level, are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command reghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01. Data is from Afrobarometer survey,
Burkina Faso, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, women only, and administrative data on year of
school establishment.

locality even though there are a small number of respondents in each cluster (526 rural village
clusters, with median number of respondents of 8, maximum of 32, and minimum of 5). Separating
by gender means there are typically only 4 respondents in a gender-village cluster, and adding
year of birth cohort dummy variables further reduces the possibility of variation, to the point that
there are typically zero or one observation per sub-group.
The various approaches find sizable and statistically significant effects of school establishment
on schooling outcomes. For the first specification, with neither geographic nor birth cohort dummy
variables, the effects are sizable. Including geographic and birth cohort dummy variables reduces
the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, suggesting that places and birth cohorts that had
relatively more respondents attain higher levels of schooling after a school was established were
also more likely to be places where respondents of school age before a school was established
attained high schooling (perhaps by going to school in neighboring villages, or because these
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villages attracted educated persons to settle in the villages). Yet even when controlling for year
of birth and village, the effects are statistically significant and sizable, for men. For example, in
Table 3 it can be seen that having a school in the village when a young boy is seven years old
is associated with an increase in the probability of having some education of 0.14 (that is, by
14 percentage points), increasing the probability of completing primary school by 0.096 (almost
10 percentage points), and increasing the measure of attainment by 0.37. This is with the most
“demanding” specification, with village dummy variables and birth year cohort dummy variables.
The effect on completing secondary is not significant in that specification, but is substantial in
the other specifications.
In Panel B the estimated magnitudes of the effects are similar. A one unit increase in the
inverse-distance weighted number of schools in proximity is associated with a 3-8 percentage point
increase in the probability of attaining some education (depending on the specification), and a
similar sized increase in the probability of completing primary school.
The effects are smaller for women, as can be seen in Table 4. For the 5-year cohort and
commune locality specification, having a school in the village when a young girl is seven years old
is associated with an increase in the probability of having some education of 0.126 (that is, by 12
percentage points), increasing the probability of completing primary school by 0.081 (8 percentage
points), and increasing the measure of attainment by 0.27. The effect on completing secondary is
0.055 (about half the size of the effect for men). In Panel B for women the estimated magnitudes
of the effects are also smaller than for men. A one unit increase in the inverse-distance weighted
number of schools in proximity is associated with about a 5 percentage point increase in the
probability of attaining some education, and a similar increase in the probability of completing
primary school, in the five-year birth cohort and commune dummies specification. The birth year
and village dummies specification does not yield statistically significant coefficients for the women
sample.
The effects of school access being smaller for women compared to those for men is unsurprising.
Even if access to school reduces the cost of schooling, there is still a school enrolment cost for the
families, that might favor their boys in a context of resource constraints and in the absence of
compulsory school enrolment. In Nigeria, Larreguy and Marshall (2017) find that the first-stage
effect of the universal primary education reform on education level is 40% lower for women. In
previous analyses on Zimbabwe (Djemai, Samson, and Renard (2022)), the differential effect of
the 1980 reform by gender has been found to be the opposite: greater for women than for men
mostly because primary school became compulsory and the level of education was greater for men
than for women before the reform.
There are many other variable coding and specification variations possible for these first stage
regressions. Some specifications could exclude the partially treated, defined as those who were 8,
9 or 10 years old when the school was established in the village. This group could have benefited
from the newly established school if they started school later in age or if they switched from being
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enrolled in a school that was further away from their village to the newly established school. For
the latter, the cost of being enrolled is reduced and continued enrollment in primary school is
likely to be exogenously increased as a result. Alternatively, one could assign partial schooling
access to those older than 7 when schools were established in the village or in the vicinity and
include that variable separately. First-stage regression and second-stage regressions results are
highly stable whether the partially treated are included or excluded from the sample (not reported
here).
Being of school age after a school was established could be interacted with a dummy variable
for whether the person was of school age after 1980 (when government promotion of schooling
accelerated). When the locality cluster is the commune or province, time-varying or fixed covariates at lower geographic levels could be included to control for some potential confounds (e.g.,
distance to commune village seat, usually the commercially important village of the area with
more public infrastructure; village population over time). Characteristics of schools (public, private, how many classrooms) might also be controlled for. In general, the “first stage” results yield
similar estimates of the effects of schooling access on education outcomes in other specifications
and variable coding choices (results not reported).
This first-stage is crucial for the credibility of second-stage estimates of the effect of schooling
levels of individuals on their political engagement. We report in Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2,
the F-statistics for excluded instruments for the various specifications. We see that the F-statistics
are generally quite large, and many above the various rules of thumb proposed in the past, except
for the case of the birth year and village dummies specification, where the F-statistic is quite
small. This last specification clearly generates a “weak instruments” problem, and so we do not
use it in estimating the second stage.
In Appendix B we also report event study graphs that provide one visual check for the parallel
trends assumption that is used to gauge the validity of difference-in-differences estimation. The
event study graphs plot the coefficients with specifications that include ten leads and ten lags,
with the furthest lead and lag accumulating the school establishment dummy prior to or after
the lag or lead. As can be seen, coefficients on lagged indicators of school establishment are not
significant. Those respondents in villages who were school age eligible well before a school was
established were not seeing rising education levels, relative to those of similar age in villages where
a school would be established even later, or not at all. Coefficients on schooling outcomes for those
who were around seven years old or younger at the time of schooling establishment are positive
and with confidence intervals above zero. The effect seems to diminish, though, as those who are
school-age-eligible more than five years prior to when a school was established do not see as large
or as statistically significant effects.
For further discussion of the first stage, we include in Appendix C the results of using the
Probit specification for the three first-stage regressions that have binary outcome variables. The
marginal effects are basically all statistically significant and the same magnitudes as in the linear
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probability model. We also discuss the two-way fixed effects (TWFE) specification and various
recent modifications to that approach, in the context of the structure of the Afrobarometer sample. Similarly, we explain why a regression discontinuity approach does not work well with the
Afrobarometer data in our case.
We turn, then, to estimates of the effects of education attainment on political engagement.

6.2

Effects of schooling outcomes on political engagement

The expansion of primary school infrastructure appears to have significantly increased the education attainment and primary completion rates of residents of rural areas. In this section, we
explore the effects of education on the index of political engagement. We present the results using
the specifications with various combinations of birth cohort and location dummies. We do not
consider in the rest of the paper the specifications that control for birth year and village dummies
as the instrumental variables (school in village or number of schools near village) exhibit low
explanatory power in the first stage.
Before turning to the IV estimates, we note that in Appendix D, Table D1 we present the
results from the naive estimation of the correlations between the index of political engagement
and the education measures (the coefficients in OLS equation with only the control for survey
round). The table also includes the coefficient from the simple OLS for each component of the
index, and for the indicator of being a member of a community group (rounds 4-7 only). In all
cases, the relationship with education is negative, and is mostly significant for women. Table D2
presents the reduced-form estimates with the binary treatment variable for having a school in the
village when school aged in Panel A, and the weighted number of schools in Panel B. Column
1 reports the estimated coefficients for the whole sample, and Columns 2 and 3 for men and
women respectively. Access to primary schools is negatively related with the index of political
engagement, and significantly so, in the specification with no cohort or locality controls. When
controlling for cohort and locality dummies, the negative effect persists mostly for men.
Table 5 presents the IV estimates with the first stage the various specifications of Table 3 with
outcome variable the index of political engagement, for men only. Panel A shows results for the
instrumental variable of whether there was a school established in the village of residence prior
to the respondent being school age eligible. Panel B shows results for the instrumental variable
indicating the number of schools in proximity to the village of residence, when the respondent
was school age eligible. Each panel reports the coefficients of interest for Equation (3), estimated
with a different education measure (as indicated in the columns). The specifications vary in the
controls for birth cohort and locality. A dummy variable for the later post-2014 survey rounds is
also included in all specifications.
In general, the results are consistent across the different measures of education and specifications. For men, the effect of education is negative and often statistically significant even with the
birth and locality controls. That is, the results suggest that education, instrumented by access to
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Table 5: Effects of education on index of political engagement, with various measures of education
outcomes instrumented with indicators of access to schooling, for men only

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: IV dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.760∗∗∗
(0.159)
-0.281
(0.199)
-0.433∗
(0.257)

-0.952∗∗∗
(0.203)
-0.373
(0.258)
-0.561∗
(0.333)

-1.089∗∗∗
(0.243)
-0.462
(0.334)
-0.697
(0.430)

-0.263∗∗∗
(0.056)
-0.102
(0.071)
-0.152∗
(0.090)

Panel B: IV number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.926∗∗∗
(0.200)
-0.461∗∗
(0.231)
-0.473∗
(0.287)

-1.042∗∗∗
(0.258)
-0.539∗
(0.277)
-0.573
(0.361)

-1.132∗∗∗
(0.286)
-0.650∗
(0.343)
-0.649
(0.426)

-0.296∗∗∗
(0.074)
-0.154∗
(0.079)
-0.159
(0.100)

Notes: Dependent variable is index of political engagement, the sum of three dummy variables (whether voted in
the prior election, whether participated in a meeting, and whether joined with others to raise an issue). Data on
the outcome is from the Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, men
only. Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level,
are in parentheses. All specifications include a dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.

school, was associated with lower levels of political engagement. The magnitudes are fairly large:
in the specifications without birth and locality controls, the effects of having some education,
completing primary, or completing secondary are all associated with reductions in the index of
engagement of about one unit; while once birth cohort and geographic locality are controlled for
the effects of the education dummy variables falls to about .5 units. The engagement index is on
a maximum three point scale, so an effect of .5 units is substantial. For specifications that use
the weighted number of schools in the proximity as instrumental variable, the education effects
remain negative, substantial, and often statistically significant even when using the birth cohort
and geographic control variables.
For women, as reported in Table 6, the effects are statistically significant when not using any
geographic controls and birth cohort controls. In that specification, the effects are negative and
basically the same magnitude as for men. For the specifications with birth cohort and locality
controls, results are statistically significant in Panel B with birth year and province, and roughly
similar magnitudes as for men.
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Table 6: Effects of education on index of political engagement, with various measures of education
outcomes instrumented with indicators of access to schooling, women only

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: IV dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.741∗∗∗
(0.212)
-0.075
(0.291)
0.116
(0.413)

-0.969∗∗∗
(0.281)
-0.101
(0.389)
0.180
(0.643)

-1.124∗∗∗
(0.323)
-0.125
(0.479)
0.251
(0.899)

-0.291∗∗∗
(0.083)
-0.031
(0.118)
0.053
(0.190)

Panel B: IV number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-1.000∗∗∗
(0.208)
-0.545∗
(0.315)
-0.066
(0.472)

-1.213∗∗∗
(0.282)
-0.645∗
(0.385)
-0.076
(0.545)

-1.365∗∗∗
(0.342)
-0.735∗
(0.436)
-0.094
(0.665)

-0.364∗∗∗
(0.084)
-0.196∗
(0.116)
-0.023
(0.166)

Notes: Dependent variable is index of political engagement, the sum of three dummy variables (whether voted in
the prior election, whether participated in a meeting, and whether joined with others to raise an issue). Data on
the outcome is from the Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, women
only. Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level,
are in parentheses. All specifications include a dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.

6.3

Effects of school outcomes on the components of index of engagement

Now we estimate the causal effect of schooling on each of the underlying four indicators of political
engagement. We present results of whether the education outcomes partly induced by access to
primary schools had effects on the four components in Table 7 for the men sample and in Table
8 for the women sample. Both tables have as outcome variables whether the person voted in the
previous election (Panel A), met with other persons to raise an issue (Panel B), was a member of a
community group (Panel C, for rounds 4-7 only) and participated in a community meeting (Panel
D). The original survey questions on membership, participation, and joining with others had four
responses, here they have been recoded to be binary variables. Each panel reports the coefficients
of interest for Equation (3), estimated with a different education measure (as indicated in the
columns). The specifications vary in the controls for birth cohort and locality. Dummy variable
for the survey rounds are also included in all specifications as in the previous tables. Both tables
report the estimated IV coefficients when the instrumental variable is whether there was a school
established in the village of residence prior to the respondent being school age eligible. Results
are reasonably similar with the use of the weighted number of schools as the instrumental variable
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and are reported in Appendix Tables E1 and E2.

Table 7: Effects of education on the four measures of political engagement, with various measures
of education, and with presence of school in the village when school eligible as instrumental
variable, men sample

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Voted in the previous election
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.218∗∗∗
(0.063)
0.124
(0.082)
0.078
(0.109)

-0.276∗∗∗
(0.079)
0.159
(0.109)
0.099
(0.142)

-0.315∗∗∗
(0.094)
0.206
(0.138)
0.126
(0.178)

-0.076∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.043
(0.029)
0.027
(0.038)

Panel B: Joined with others to raise an issue
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.234∗∗∗
(0.070)
-0.159
(0.100)
-0.117
(0.120)

-0.289∗∗∗
(0.089)
-0.206
(0.131)
-0.149
(0.155)

-0.328∗∗∗
(0.102)
-0.259
(0.168)
-0.186
(0.195)

-0.081∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.056
(0.036)
-0.041
(0.042)

Panel C: Member of a community group
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.314∗∗∗
(0.081)
-0.277∗∗
(0.121)
-0.295∗
(0.155)

-0.392∗∗∗
(0.105)
-0.380∗∗
(0.170)
-0.404∗
(0.223)

-0.450∗∗∗
(0.121)
-0.497∗∗
(0.229)
-0.546∗
(0.312)

-0.113∗∗∗
(0.030)
-0.105∗∗
(0.047)
-0.112∗
(0.060)

Panel D: Participated in a meeting
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.317∗∗∗
(0.065)
-0.246∗∗∗
(0.091)
-0.362∗∗∗
(0.123)

-0.396∗∗∗
(0.082)
-0.327∗∗∗
(0.121)
-0.468∗∗∗
(0.160)

-0.446∗∗∗
(0.095)
-0.406∗∗
(0.159)
-0.580∗∗∗
(0.212)

-0.111∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.089∗∗∗
(0.033)
-0.128∗∗∗
(0.044)

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, five rounds (except in Panel C, rounds
4-7). Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level,
are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.

In general, the results are consistent across the four outcome variables and different measures
of education. For all four outcomes, the specification without birth cohort and locality dummy
variables yields negative and statistically significant coefficients of the education variable. That
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is, the estimations suggest that education, instrumented by access to school, is associated with
lower levels of political engagement. These results hold for both men and women. For instance,
having been enrolled in school decreases the probability of voting by 22 percentage points for men
(column 1, Panel A of Table 7) and, very similarly, by 16 percentage points for women (column
1, Panel A of Table 8).
Once cohort and locality controls are introduced, however, the estimated coefficients are never
statistically significant for women. For men, some of the individual components have statistically
significant negative coefficients. For two of the outcomes (membership in a community group and
participation in community meetings), the coefficients remain negative and significant when using
province-level geographic controls and year of birth cohort controls, and when using commune
dummies and 5-year birth cohorts. But for the other two specifications and outcomes (voting
behavior and joining with others to raise an issue), the instrumented effect of education is not
significant. These results are roughly similar across all four measures of education.
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Table 8: Effects of education on the four measures of political engagement, with various measures
of education, and with presence of school in the village when school eligible as instrumental
variable, women sample

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Voted in the previous election
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.161∗
(0.087)
0.134
(0.117)
0.083
(0.169)

-0.210∗
(0.114)
0.178
(0.156)
0.128
(0.262)

-0.243∗
(0.132)
0.219
(0.192)
0.177
(0.364)

-0.063∗
(0.034)
0.054
(0.047)
0.038
(0.077)

Panel B: Joined with others to raise an issue
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.269∗∗∗
(0.090)
-0.048
(0.137)
0.055
(0.207)

-0.344∗∗∗
(0.116)
-0.065
(0.186)
0.088
(0.333)

-0.399∗∗∗
(0.135)
-0.083
(0.237)
0.130
(0.494)

-0.104∗∗∗
(0.035)
-0.020
(0.057)
0.026
(0.098)

Panel C: Member of a community group
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.289∗∗
(0.114)
-0.076
(0.173)
-0.119
(0.273)

-0.371∗∗
(0.146)
-0.101
(0.230)
-0.160
(0.366)

-0.416∗∗
(0.163)
-0.123
(0.276)
-0.219
(0.498)

-0.112∗∗
(0.044)
-0.031
(0.070)
-0.050
(0.113)

Panel D: Participated in a meeting
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.354∗∗∗
(0.095)
-0.152
(0.137)
0.007
(0.208)

-0.453∗∗∗
(0.122)
-0.206
(0.186)
0.011
(0.330)

-0.525∗∗∗
(0.141)
-0.262
(0.234)
0.016
(0.485)

-0.137∗∗∗
(0.037)
-0.062
(0.056)
0.003
(0.097)

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, five rounds (except in Panel C, rounds
4-7). Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level,
are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.

7

Geographic and birth cohort dummies, and power considerations

Overall, we find that the causal effect of education on political engagement is likely negative for
men, and zero for women. For men, the effect is negative for the index of engagement and for
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the four separate measures of political engagement. For women the results appear to be zero
effects on all of the measures of engagement, once controls are included. The results suggest that
for Burkina Faso there is little reason to think there is a sizable positive relationship between
education levels of a person and their likelihood of being politically engaged (as measured in the
Afrobarometer surveys). The “null” results for women could be due to misspecification and to
lack of statistical power to detect a sizable effect, so we turn to those issues.
As noted earlier, estimation results with a specification including birth year cohorts and geographic dummy variables at the village level are not reported here, because the great majority
of villages only have 8 observations, with dummy variable for birth cohort, and split by gender,
most observation cells are empty. The estimated coefficients in such specifications are close to
zero and never statistically significant. This raises the general issue of statistical power. If there
were 80 observations in each village, presumably the only specification that mattered would be
the one with village level dummy variables.
Other empirical analyses using the Afrobarometer data recognize this small sample problem
and the trade-off implied. Briggs (2019) estimated that the presence of a foreign aid project
within 50 km of a locality reduced support for incumbent presidents, using Afrobarometer data
for Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda (the three countries for which aid data was available). He
reported two specifications, one using country dummy variables and the other using region dummy
variables for the highest administrative level of the country. His discussion of the choice of the
level of dummy variables is worth quoting in full: “Comparing within region-rounds increases
the likelihood that I am comparing across groups of people that are similar except for their aid
status, but many region-rounds lack observations in at least one of the three aid categories ... so
relatively few observations contribute identifying variation when using region-round fixed effects.
This is much less of an issue when using country-round fixed effects, but in this case I am less
likely to be comparing groups of people that are similar aside from their aid status because I
allow comparisons across regions within the same country and survey round. Neither approach is
obviously better and so I report results from both approaches.” T. Knutsen and Kotsadam (2020),
Cha (2020), and Watkins (2021) estimate quite similar relationships between various measures of
aid to a locality and various political outcomes.
C. H. Knutsen et al. (2017), to take another example, estimated that industrial mines locating
in proximity to villages and towns likely increased local corruption. They used a variety of
corruption related questions in the Afrobarometer surveys for 33 countries. They coded a dummy
variable for whether an industrial mine was located within 50 km of the respondent’s residence.
For rural residents, then, the empirical strategy was quite similar to ours. Their locality dummy
variables were set at the country level in one specification, and at the 50km radius around a
mine in another specification. They noted that the latter “conservative” specification, “... has
the advantage of only comparing the exact same areas before and after mine opening. The
disadvantage is that we only have Afrobarometer observations before and after mine openings for
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a few locations, making this a demanding test.” Indeed, while with country level dummy variables
all four estimated effects of an active mine on corruption were statistically significant, with the
mine locality dummy variable only one of the coefficients remained statistically significant.
Similarly, Konte and Vincent (2021) used Afrobarometer data to estimate that industrial
mining worsened perceptions of the quality of public services and worsened respondents’ optimism
about future living conditions. Their empirical specification used only country level dummy
variables.
Choi, Laughlin, and Schultz (2021) used Afrobarometer data to estimate that individuals who
gained access to mobile internet coverage were less likely on average to identify with a national
identity instead of an ethnic identity. As dummy variables they used country and administration
level (the highest level for each country), and also 0.5 × 0.5 degree grid cells of approximately 55
× 55 square km, in the various specifications.
In our linear models, the causal effect of education on the index of political engagement and
the causal effect of education on the underlying four indicators of political engagement is not
significant for women when we control for birth cohorts and locality of residence, and for men
in certain specifications. The estimated null effects may be due to a true zero effect or to a lack
of power to detect a reasonable sized effect. The standard definition of power is one minus the
probability of Type II error, where Type II error is when the “true” β in Equation (3) is different
from zero but we fail to reject the null hypothesis (Campbell and Gustafson (2018); Walker et
al. (2017); Parinduri (2019)). We may evaluate the power of the estimation approach using the R
package ivmodel, developed by Kang et al. (2021). The package implements the power formula
developed by Freeman, Cowling, and Schooling (2013). The formula appears to be appropriate to
our setting; Kang et al. (2021) use as their example data the analysis of Card (1995), who pioneered
the estimation approach used here. Card (1995) estimated the income returns to schooling with
an instrumental variable measuring distance to a college; the sample size he used, about 3,000
observations, was similar to that used here.
Figures 6 and 7 show that for the three education indicators considered (some schooling,
completed primary, and education level), and with whether there was a school in the village at
the time the person was eligible for school as the instrumental variable, the estimation appears
to be adequately powered for relevant effect sizes for the sub-sample of rural men surveyed in the
Afrobarometer, but not for the sub-sample of women. As we have seen in Table 5, the estimated
coefficient for men is about -0.5 for the two binary indicators and about -0.3 for the index of
schooling level. The different effect sizes (here not standardized, but rather the magnitude of the
coefficient) are on the x-axes, and the power is indicated on the y-axis. The power is calculated
for the men-only sample, with about 2,100 observations.
In Figure 6 when education is measured by having some schooling, we exceed 80% power if
the size of the effect on the political engagement index is in the -0.7 to -0.4 range, in specifications
with no geographic or birth year controls. We have about 80% power for -0.7 to -0.5 range
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Figure 6: Power calculations for different education variables (endogenous) using schooling access
as instrument and outcome variable the index of political engagement, men sample
Notes: Power calculated under various effect sizes (magnitudes of coefficients) using R package ivmodel
developed by Kang et al. (2021), using Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents born after
1950, men only (sample size about 2,100).

range with province dummies and birth year cohorts, and with commune dummies and five-year
birth cohorts we are below 80% power for effect sizes below -0.7. When the education measure is
whether the person completed primary, power declines, since there is less variation in the sample in
this indicator. But power remains above 80% for relevant coefficient magnitudes in specifications
with no geographic or birth year controls. Specifications with commune dummies and five-year
birth cohorts are under-powered for coefficient effects below -0.7. When the interval variable
for education attainment is used as the education indicator, the effect is for a one unit increase
in the indicator, and the estimated coefficient range as seen in Table 5 was between -0.5 and
-0.1. Power appears to be adequate for coefficient magnitudes of -0.3 or greater, since there is
considerably more variation in this indicator of education. Overall, these specifications appear to
have reasonable power to detect economically and politically relevant effects.
The picture is quite different when we calculate power using the women sample. Despite
the sample being slightly larger (2,168 observations), as can be seen in Figure 7, power is lower
for the binary education variables. Power is only adequate for the very large effect sizes for
some of the specifications (i.e., the specification with no controls). When the interval variable
for education attainment is used as the education indicator, power appears to be adequate for
coefficient magnitudes of -0.3 or greater, in the specification with province and birth year cohort
dummy variables. But for the others, there simply is not enough variation in education outcomes,
within birth and geographic units, to estimate the coefficient of interest with much precision.
Appendix F contains similar power analysis for the regressions with the separate components
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Figure 7: Power calculations for different education variables (endogenous) using schooling access
as instrument and outcome variable the index of political engagement, women sample
Notes: Power calculated under various effect sizes (magnitudes of coefficients) using R package ivmodel
developed by Kang et al. (2021), using Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents born after
1950, women only (sample size 2,168).

of the engagement index, for men (the results for women are quite similar). The analysis suggests
that specifications with the education level variable have considerably more power than those with
the dummy variables for schooling attainment, that specifications with no geographic or birth
cohort controls are adequately powered, while specifications with geographic and birth cohort
controls are only powered for larger effects.

8

Attitudes towards democracy

We now digress and consider attitudes and preferences regarding democracy as the preferred
system of government, and views about the functioning of democracy in Burkina Faso. These
attitudes now are the outcome variables, instead of the responses about political engagement.
The analysis may offer insight into why more educated rural men are less likely to be politically engaged. In large-sample analyses of World Values Survey and Afrobarometer, more education is typically found to be associated with more positive attitudes towards democracy as
the “better” system of government, though the correlations are not credibly identified as causal
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015); Aquino (2015)). We use the same specification as in the
previous section, with the presence of a school in the village of residence when the person was
school eligible as an instrumental variable for the respondent’s level of education.
Respondents to the Afrobarometer in Burkina Faso were asked whether they were satisfied
with the democracy in the country at the time of the survey (from 1: not at all, to 4: very
satisfied). Over the five rounds of survey, 11.3% respondents were not satisfied at all, 30.6% not
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satisfied, 39% rather satisfied, and 19.1% very satisfied. Panel A in Tables 9 and 10 uses as the
dependent variable a binary variable equal to one if the respondent declared being satisfied or very
satisfied, and Panel B uses the categorical variable. In both cases, satisfaction is significantly lower
for educated men compared to less educated men, for all three specifications. For women, the
education does not significantly influence the level of satisfaction toward the level of democracy.
In addition, respondents were asked about their views about the level of democracy in Burkina
Faso at the time of the survey over a four-point scale: 1 not a democracy, 2 a democracy with
minor concerns, 3 a democracy with major concerns, 4 a full democracy. 8% of the respondents
considered that Burkina Faso was not a democracy, at the other extreme, 28.2% viewed the country
as a full democracy. Panel C uses the 4-point scale perception measure as dependent variable.
Once again, the effect of education for men is negative and significant across all specifications and
all measures of education. For women, the effect is negative as well. It is significant in the first
two specifications and for every measure of education.
Lastly, people were also asked about their preferences for democratic or non democratic regime.
Over the five rounds, 9.8% reported that they preferred non-democratic regimes, 73.7% democratic
regimes, and 16.5% declared that the type of regime did not matter for people like them. Panel
D estimates the IV coefficient of education on the probability of declaring a preference for a
democratic regime. There is no significant effect, not surprisingly given the limited variation in
the survey responses.
Overall, the main results are that more educated men appeared to be less satisfied with the
level of democracy in Burkina Faso than less educated men. Moreover, educated men were less
likely to see Burkina Faso as a full democracy, but there was no significant effect of education
on their preference for a democratic regime. For women, on the other hand, education was not a
significant and consistent predictor of attitudes towards democracy.
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Table 9: Effects of education on the attitudes, with various measures of education, and with
presence of school in the village when school eligible as instrumental variable, men sample

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Satisfied with the level of democracy
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.216∗∗∗
(0.066)
-0.309∗∗∗
(0.102)
-0.275∗∗
(0.127)

-0.265∗∗∗
(0.081)
-0.405∗∗∗
(0.134)
-0.364∗∗
(0.171)

-0.301∗∗∗
(0.093)
-0.507∗∗∗
(0.173)
-0.457∗∗
(0.218)

-0.075∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.110∗∗∗
(0.036)
-0.098∗∗
(0.045)

Panel B: Satisfaction [1;4]
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.489∗∗∗
(0.124)
-0.656∗∗∗
(0.195)
-0.605∗∗
(0.239)

-0.602∗∗∗
(0.152)
-0.860∗∗∗
(0.259)
-0.802∗∗
(0.327)

-0.682∗∗∗
(0.175)
-1.077∗∗∗
(0.333)
-1.005∗∗
(0.416)

-0.169∗∗∗
(0.043)
-0.234∗∗∗
(0.069)
-0.216∗∗
(0.086)

Panel C: Views about democracy in Burkina Faso
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.463∗∗∗
(0.123)
-0.690∗∗∗
(0.190)
-0.789∗∗∗
(0.255)

-0.560∗∗∗
(0.148)
-0.879∗∗∗
(0.249)
-1.002∗∗∗
(0.338)

-0.630∗∗∗
(0.168)
-1.080∗∗∗
(0.314)
-1.225∗∗∗
(0.427)

-0.158∗∗∗
(0.041)
-0.239∗∗∗
(0.066)
-0.271∗∗∗
(0.088)

Panel D: Preferences for democracy
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.088
(0.062)
-0.015
(0.087)
0.033
(0.111)

-0.110
(0.076)
-0.019
(0.115)
0.044
(0.145)

-0.124
(0.086)
-0.025
(0.144)
0.053
(0.181)

-0.031
(0.021)
-0.005
(0.031)
0.012
(0.039)

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds. Coefficients of the
education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level, are in parentheses. All
specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular uprising leading to
democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are estimated with
Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.
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Table 10: Effects of education on the attitudes, with various measures of education, and with
presence of school in the village when school eligible as instrumental variable, women sample

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Satisfied with the level of democracy
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.051
(0.093)
-0.021
(0.136)
0.152
(0.235)

-0.064
(0.118)
-0.027
(0.181)
0.233
(0.366)

-0.075
(0.137)
-0.035
(0.234)
0.357
(0.581)

-0.020
(0.036)
-0.008
(0.055)
0.070
(0.110)

Panel B: Satisfaction [1;4]
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.194
(0.175)
-0.286
(0.265)
-0.057
(0.423)

-0.244
(0.221)
-0.380
(0.354)
-0.087
(0.646)

-0.283
(0.256)
-0.492
(0.460)
-0.133
(0.989)

-0.074
(0.067)
-0.117
(0.108)
-0.026
(0.195)

Panel C: Views about democracy in Burkina Faso
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.341∗∗
(0.158)
-0.551∗∗
(0.244)
-0.547
(0.392)

-0.426∗∗
(0.197)
-0.709∗∗
(0.320)
-0.778
(0.558)

-0.492∗∗
(0.227)
-0.901∗∗
(0.408)
-1.093
(0.793)

-0.129∗∗
(0.059)
-0.217∗∗
(0.097)
-0.235
(0.167)

Panel D: Preferences for democracy
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.026
(0.089)
-0.025
(0.131)
0.221
(0.212)

-0.032
(0.111)
-0.033
(0.174)
0.333
(0.327)

-0.037
(0.128)
-0.041
(0.216)
0.481
(0.484)

-0.010
(0.034)
-0.010
(0.052)
0.099
(0.096)

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds. Coefficients of the
education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level, are in parentheses. All
specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular uprising leading to
democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are estimated with
Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.

9

Conclusion

Patterns of political engagement by citizens likely influence the quality of economic policymaking,
especially in the provision of public goods and the choices made regarding policies that have broad
rather than concentrated benefits (Khemani et al. (2016)). The relationship between education
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and political engagement has been a perennial concern in political economy, as democracies around
the world ebb and flow. Recent work has suggested the relationship may be quite variable,
both in terms of different social groups exhibiting different tendencies and in terms of tendencies
changing significantly as political contexts change. Some of this research has used individual
survey data and quasi-experimental estimation approaches, as we do (André and Maarek (2020);
Croke et al. (2016); Larreguy and Marshall (2017); Dang (2019); Blaydes (2006); Kuenzi (2006);
Parinduri (2019); Mattes and Mughogho (2009)). A few papers have leveraged randomized control
trials to examine the relationship (Friedman et al. (2016)). Some papers approach the relationship
at a more aggregated level (Acemoglu et al. (2005); Paglayan (2021)).
This paper has matched information about the timing of establishment of primary schools at
the village level to nationally-representative household survey data from Burkina Faso to analyse
the relationship between education and political engagement. The timing of school establishment relative to the age of each respondent provides an instrumental variable for the individual’s
education attainment. Our results suggest that formal schooling in the contexts of low overall
education levels, as is typical of many African countries, probably has more of a negative effect
on political engagement than one might have thought. This negative finding appears to be clear
for men, but the low level of variation in schooling outcomes for women means our data and
estimation approach are under-powered for women. The finding of a negative relationship may be
specific to the data used here, and estimates of the relationship with data from other countries and
other electoral contexts may vary. Given the continued expansion of formal education, and the
pronounced trend away from democratic governance in many West African countries with recent
military-led coups d’etat, the finding of a negative relationship between education and political
engagement should be cause for concern for citizens of Burkina Faso and other countries of the
region.
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Appendix A
This appendix describes the data cleaning process applied to the list Répertoire des écoles publiques
et privées du Burkina Faso en 2004-2005 produced by the Direction des études et de la planification of the Ministère de l’enseignement de base et de l’alphabétisation (MEBA) produced in March
2006. The goal of the data cleaning was to be able to merge the school list to the Afrobarometer
villages and to geo-locate all schools by their village.
Two features of the list require researcher data coding choices. The first is that there is no
variable for ‘village’ which is the basic unit of geographic location for Burkina Faso. The second is
that the school lists are organized by their Circonscription d’Education de Base (CEB) which was
the basic geographic unit for administration of schools of the MEBA. Each CEB was supervised
by a Direction Provinciale (DPEBA) and then by a Direction Régionale (DREBA). The schools
are not grouped by the political administrative unit of the commune. A commune, in Burkina
Faso, is the primary or lowest layer for geographically defined administrative entities. Under the
decentralization law of 2006, every locality in the country is in the jurisdiction of a commune
with an elected council (Champagne and Ouedraogo (2011); Mahieu and Yilmaz (2010)). Urban
communes often include some rural villages within their boundaries. Most of the CEB overlap
with communes, but in many instances the CEB might be located in an urban commune and
the inspectors will have responsibility for some urban schools and some rural schools in the rural
commune neighboring the urban commune.
We deal with these issues in two ways. First, we wrote code that strips away all common
words, numbers, punctuation and extraneous letters from school titles. We call that the “imputed
village name.” Very frequently, the words that remained were indeed the name of the village
(i.e., “Ecole de Tanghin, garcons sud” became “Tanghin”, almost certainly the name of the village
where the school was located). But sometimes they were clearly not (i.e., “1200 logements” is the
name of a residential district in Ouagadougou, and not of a village). Since the list classified some
schools as urban, we determined the set of 30 communes that included 10 or more urban schools.
We then merged that list with the schools list: if the imputed village name matched the village
name listed as part of the commune, then it was retained. If the imputed village name did not
however match any village name in the urban commune, then the urban commune became the
name of the village (i.e., “1200 logements”became Ouagadougou).
Misclassifications here are not likely to be significantly troublesome, since as we see below
we coded an individual’s access to schooling as a distance radius (1km, 5km, 10km, 30km), and
many communes would thus include the other villages in the commune in this radius. What
we worry about, though, is that a village with a school with a peculiar name may have been
mistakenly listed as urban (the school list indicates urban or rural, but there is no explanation
for the criterion), and so was assigned to the town of the commune, rather than the village. Our
understanding of school names and village names suggest this problem was likely to be rare.
To deal with the second problem, that some CEB encompassed more than one commune,
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we carried out a similar exercise. We created a list of all villages with unique names, and their
provinces and communes. We then merged that list onto the school list, using the village name
and province as the match. If the CEB of the school list did not match the commune from the
IGB list, than the CEB was replaced with the IGB commune.
With these two modifications to the list, we obtained a list of 6,917 schools with founding
dates, by village (or town), commune, province, and region. We then matched these to the IGB
geographic spatial database, by village (or town), commune, province, and region. There were
5,524 that matched exactly. We then conducted a fuzzy match, and visually inspected these
matches, to obtain about 1,000 more matches. We thus had a list of 6,500 schools that were
correctly geo-located. The remaining 400 schools for which the school name and CEB did not
permit an automated match were manually inspected and matched to a village and commune.
There were a variety of patterns in this manual matching, and thus a few rules of thumb for
coding led to some consistency in the choices of matches.
First, some villages in Burkina Faso have numbers or directions indicating the village, for
example in some irrigation projects or resettlement zones. So villages might be Rakaye 1, Rakaye
2, Rakaye 3, or Solle Sud and Solle Nord, etc. In the other list the village might simply be Rakaye
or Solle. In these cases, we match to the number 1 village or to the north village.
Second, some villages also are described by the predominant ethnic group, in areas where
ethnic groups are more segregation. So there might be Waria Mossi, Waria Peulh, and Waria
Yarce. The school village might be Waria. In this case, we usually assign the school to the Waria
Mossi village. This assignment may of course have some error, but since we use two measures of
school establishment (in the village and within a distance radius) these villages, which are usually
fairly proximate, will be counted in their respective distance radii.
Third, there is considerable non-standardization of spelling for all of the local languages of
Burkina Faso, and village names are almost all local names. People from the same village may
spell their village in different ways. So a village might have many different spellings: Ouarankuy,
Warankui, Ourankui, Warounkuy, Walankuy, Oualranko. Further complexity is added when
consonants in the French spelling do not correspond to consonant sounds in local languages: r,
l, and lr may all stand for the same sound in a local language. Moreover, many village names
are variants of locally-important words or phrases (the equivalent of “Big Tree,”“Tall Trees,” and
“Tree Grove”) and so may be pronounced similarly in local languages, so their written names may
overlap. A poor spelling of a village name might end up being more close to the correct spelling
of another village name. This poses a challenge for an iterative algorithm to correct names and
match names because changing a name on a second list that has a name that reasonably matches
then changes the names available to match to a third and fourth list. So two villages on two
different lists, Walankuy and Ouarankuy, are matched and standardized to Ouarankuy. But a
third list has a village Wargankuy that might have been a good match for Walankuy but instead
matches to Walugaye.
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Appendix B: F-statistics for “first stage” regressions
This appendix presents results from the various “first-stage” specifications discussed in Section
6.1. The outcome variables are: a binary variable for whether the person had any schooling; a
binary if completed primary school; a binary variable for some secondary; and the scale value of
schooling attainment. We first present two summary tables with the F-statistics for the first-stage
regressions presented in section 6.1.
Tables 3 and 4 present results from regressions where the principal explanatory variable is
either a dummy variable for whether the respondent was school age eligible after school establishment in the village of residence (Panel A), or the weighted average of the number of primary
schools when the person was of school age (Panel B), for men and for women, respectively. Each
specification has a dummy for whether the Afrobarometer survey round was post-2014. There are
also two sets of dummy variables included, cohort of birth (year, or 5-year group) and locality
of residence (at either the province, commune, or village level), as indicated. As noted in the
text, the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the effect of school establishment on schooling
attainment was sizable. Persons who were born after a school was established saw substantial
increases on average in all four measures of schooling outcomes, relative to those born earlier.
The relevant F-statistics for the variables that constitutes the two possible instrumental variables (primary school access in the village, or inverse-distance weighted average of number of
schools) are displayed in Table B1. The table for the male sample suggests that access to primary school within the village or proximity to neighboring schools produces a reasonably convincing first-stage F-statistic, where “convincing” ranges from the value greater than 10 that
remains a common rule of thumb (Staiger and Stock (1997)) to the more recent reminders that
F-statistics on the order of 100 are needed for proper hypothesis testing (Lee et al. (2021); Keane
and Neal (2021)). In the case of the village-level dummy variables, the estimated coefficients of
interest approach zero and are often no longer statistically significant. The village geographic unit
typically only includes 8 persons, and with controls for gender, survey round and birth cohort
there is often no variation in whether respondents were of school age before or after school establishment. The F-statistics for this most demanding specification is below 10 for both instrumental
variables.
For the women sample, Table B2 suggests again that access to primary school within the
village or proximity to neighboring schools produces a reasonably convincing first-stage F-statistic.
Again, the specification with the village-level adn birth-year level dummy variables has lower Fstatistics and here close to zero, so these specifications are not used for the IV estimation.
Specifications with both variables included as explanatory variables (primary school access in
the village and inverse-distance weighted number of primary schools) produced about the same
F-statistics for men and women samples. There was no gain in precision of estimates.
Specifications were estimated using the Stata command reghdfe. The command drops singletons in clusters of two-way fixed effects. For this reason, the sample sizes may vary slightly
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(Correia (2015)).

Table B1: F-statistics of various specifications of first-stage regressions of effects of school in
village or near village, when individual of school age, on education outcomes, men only
(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

177.6
86.8
62.5
9.8

122.2
62.7
48.6
5.6

107.3
44.3
33.7
2.2

146.6
78.4
60.9
8.7

Panel B: Number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

86.0
72.8
48.3
7.2

138.6
81.6
37.4
4.1

112.8
69.4
38.4
7.5

101.4
69.4
40.1
6.2

Notes: Each F-statistic in the table is for a separate regression, according to the specification (row) and outcome
measure (column) and measure of access to schools (panel). All specifications include dummy variable for two
post-2014 survey rounds (after popular uprising leading to democratic transition) and birth cohort and geographic
dummy variables as indicated, and are estimated with Stata command reghdfe. Data is from Afrobarometer
survey, Burkina Faso, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, men only, and administrative data on year
of school establishment.

Table B2: F-statistics of various specifications of first-stage regressions of effects of school in
village or near village, when individual of school age, on education outcomes, women only
(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

119.6
59.3
22.2
0.0

88.4
40.8
12.1
0.6

75.5
29.8
7.6
1.4

98.1
48.4
15.9
0.4

Panel B: Number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

46.9
34.6
22.5
3.0

37.7
37.6
30.8
1.5

34.8
32.3
22.4
3.6

39.0
35.4
27.2
3.3

Notes: Each F-statistic in the table is for a separate regression, according to the specification (row) and outcome
measure (column) and measure of access to schools (panel). All specifications include dummy variable for two
post-2014 survey rounds (after popular uprising leading to democratic transition) and birth cohort and geographic
dummy variables as indicated, and are estimated with Stata command reghdfe. Data is from Afrobarometer
survey, Burkina Faso, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, women only, and administrative data on
year of school establishment.

49

Figure B1 displays event study graphs for the three different specification (no controls, halfdecade and commune controls, and birth-year and province controls). The outcome variable is the
education attainment level. The event study graph plots the coefficients from specifications that
include ten leads and ten lags, with the furthest lead and lag accumulating the school establishment
dummy prior to or after the lag or lead. Coefficients on lagged indicators of school establishment
are not significant, except for one, and are centered on zero, for the most part. Coefficients on
schooling outcomes for those who were around seven years old or younger at the time of schooling
establishment are positive and with confidence intervals above zero. The effect seems to diminish,
though, and the lead coefficient for 5 years (the effect on education attainment for those who were
2 years old when the school was established) is zero when we add the geographic and birth cohort
dummies, though it is higher for subsequent leads. The results are quite similar when using the
dummy variable for whether the person had some schooling.
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Figure B1: Event study style graph of coefficients of lags and leads of treatment variable effect
on education attainment level
Source: Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents only, birth year after 1950. The sample
used in the regression estimation pooled men and women together, and included a dummy variable
control for whether the person was male.

Appendix C: Alternative first-stage regression models
In this appendix we discuss three alternative specification strategies for the first stage regression.
These are the Probit specification, the two-way fixed effects specification, and the regression
discontinuity specification.
Probit

Tables C1 and C2 present the results from probit regressions for the binary education

outcome variables (whether the person had any schooling; whether the person completed primary
school; and whether had some secondary education). The probit specifications were estimated
with Stata command probit. The coefficients presented are the marginal effects calculated by
the Stata option margins, dydx. As in the linear probability model of Tables 3 and 4, the
coefficients on the two indicators of access to schooling (school in the village, and inverse-distance
weighted number of schools) are sizable and statistically significant. The probit specifications
yield a somewhat better fit in particular for the specification with village geographic fixed effects
along with birth year controls, compared with the linear probability model. The results reinforce
the validity of our instrumental variables.
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Table C1: Probit estimate of effects of school in village or near village, when individual of school
age, on education outcomes, various specifications, men only
(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

Panel A: Dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.298∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.224∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.209∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.162∗∗∗
(0.058)

0.238∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.180∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.180∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.142∗∗
(0.062)

0.210∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.151∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.157∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.102
(0.069)

Panel B: Number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.095∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.096∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.090∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.082∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.084∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.086∗∗∗
(0.028)

0.075∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.066∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.068∗∗
(0.030)

Notes: Each coefficient and standard error in the table is for a separate regression, according to the specification
(row) and outcome measure (column) and measure of schooling access (panel). For Panel A the coefficient is that
of the dummy variable indicating if a school was present, for Panel B the coefficient is the variable representing
the count of schools, each weighted by the inverse distance squared, where distance is the measure in kilometers of
the distance from the village of residence to the village of the school. Standard errors, clustered at the village
level, are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command probit. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01. Data is from Afrobarometer survey,
Burkina Faso, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, men only, and administrative data on year of school
establishment.
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Table C2: Probit estimate of effects of school in village or near village, when individual of school
age, on education outcomes, various specifications, women only
(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

Panel A: Dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.229∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.167∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.128∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.046
(0.059)

0.182∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.138∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.101∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.070
(0.079)

0.158∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.118∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.089∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.076
(0.098)

Panel B: Number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune
Birth year, village

0.092∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.089∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.077∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.019
(0.027)

0.076∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.077∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.016
(0.037)

0.066∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.057∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.016
(0.050)

Notes: Each coefficient and standard error in the table is for a separate regression, according to the specification
(row) and outcome measure (column) and measure of schooling access (panel). For Panel A the coefficient is that
of the dummy variable indicating if a school was present, for Panel B the coefficient is the variable representing
the count of schools, each weighted by the inverse distance squared, where distance is the measure in kilometers of
the distance from the village of residence to the village of the school. Standard errors, clustered at the village
level, are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command probit. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01. Data is from Afrobarometer survey,
Burkina Faso, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds, women only, and administrative data on year of
school establishment.

Two-way Fixed Effects Another possible specification is a two-way fixed effect (TWFE) strategy
that is a generalization of the difference-in-differences (DID) strategy (Mittag (2012); Sun and
Abraham (2020); Goodman-Bacon (2021); De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020)). School
construction programs take place slowly over time, or reforms affect different localities at different
times, and so the change in access or intensity of access is best described as a ‘staggered treatment.’
The standard DID setting with two groups and two time periods may not apply to settings where
multiple groups are observed over a large time period and where all treated groups do not receive
the treatment at the same time (staggered adoption design).
For all pairs of consecutive time periods t − 1 and t, the DID compares the outcome evolution
among groups whose treatment changes from t − 1 to t (switchers) and groups whose treatment
does not change. We might expect that the effect of building a new school in the village is different
depending on the year of construction. The effect might be very high at the beginning of the period
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when there are very few alternative schools in the surrounding villages, or on the opposite very
small at the beginning of the period because the perceived benefits of school enrolment were lower
in the 1960s than those in the 2000s and the government was not encouraging school attendance
at that time.
The TWFE strategy is to use all localities without a new school (or policy change) at a
particular time as controls for the treatment localities where new schools are established or where
schooling policies are changed. In the ‘naive’ TWFE no regard is given to the quite different
nature of the localities in the control group. These include: ‘never switch’ localities that will
never get schools or policy reforms; ‘later switch’ localities that will have schools established or
reforms implemented later relative to the treatment locality; and ‘previously switched’ localities
that had schools established or reforms adopted prior to the treatment locality, and where an
assumption is made that recent treatment will have a different effect on outcomes than treatment
in earlier years. Thus, the average effect of school availability or schooling reform is estimated by
calculating a weighted average of the differences between those individuals in a locality eligible
for schooling in a particular year, and similarly aged children in other localities in that same year
(who may be in one of the three different kinds of localities).
Several papers have proposed a variety of TWFE estimators that do take into account the
compositional issues discussed above, and have applied them in the context of using the TWFE
estimate as a first stage in a two-stage least squares approach. These papers relax the assumption that the treatment effect is constant over time.

Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020);

Sun and Abraham (2020); De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2021) have proposed estimators that apply when the treatment is binary and staggered and there are dynamic heterogeneous effects. The main difference between Sun and Abraham (2020) and De Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfoeuille (2021) estimators is the control group used in the analysis. Sun and Abraham (2020) use as controls the never-treated groups (or the groups treated in the very last period if
all groups are treated by the end of the period) while De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2021)
consider all the not-yet-treated observations in a larger control group.
The De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2021) estimator, denoted by DIDM is the average
of DIDs across all pairs of periods. Under a parallel trends assumption, DIDM is an unbiased
and consistent estimator of the average treatment effect among switchers, at the time period
when they get the treatment. In staggered adoption designs where additional groups receive the
treatment and already treated groups remain treated, the estimator of dynamic effects is similar
to the DIDM estimator, except that it makes use of long differences of the outcome (e.g. from
t-1 to t+1) rather than first differences. In other words it can compute estimators of switchers’
dynamic treatment effects, one time period or more after the switchers have started receiving the
treatment. This is relevant in our case to estimate and discuss the size of the instantaneous effect
and the longer-term effects.
The De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2021) estimator does not perfectly apply to our
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setting for several reasons. First, all groups are observed at unevenly spaced intervals. Within a
village, we do not observe respondents from all the birth years of the panel (1950-2000). Second,
in some villages, we do not observe someone eligible the year right before the construction, the
given year, and the year after the construction. These observations are required to compute
estimators based on first differences. For instance, in the village Bouere in region Hauts-Bassins,
the school was established in 1985 and there is no respondent who turned seven years old in 1984
and in 1985. The sample includes six respondents born in 1968, 1978, 1981, 1987, 1988, and in
1996. As we do not observe the outcome of the relevant cohorts, this location can not be used to
compute the DIDM estimator. The majority of villages would then be dropped, in implementing
this estimator. Third, even though within a village, we might observe respondents eligible around
the year of school establishment, at most it would be two respondents for each year and the law
of large numbers does not hold. This would require us to make the very strong assumption that
these two respondents are representative of their respective birth cohort. Fourth, the size of our
sample within groups (village, cohort) and the number of switchers we have, do not allow us to
estimate dynamic effects for more than two years after the school establishment (same for the
placebo estimation of the effects before the school establishment to check for parallel trends).
Last, in Burkina Faso, as in other places (see Colclough, Rose, and Tembon (2000) for Guinea),
it is often the case that children start school later than the official starting age. It is then difficult
to argue that children born one or two years before the first cohort who benefit from the school
construction were excluded from that school. (The difference between gross and net enrolment
rates in places like Burkina Faso reflects this phenomenon of repeated school years and delayed
school entry. The gross enrolment rate is on average 7-15 percentage points larger than the net
enrolment rates, depending on the year of observation of enrolment rates).
Regression Discontinuity Another alternative specification is a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) strategy where the identification relies on the discontinuity around the cutoff point. In
our setting, the running variable is then equal to the birth year + 7 - the year of school opening
and is equal to zero for the cohort who become eligible the year of the school opening. The cutoff
point is when the running variable is equal to zero and we should find that a discontinuity at the
cutoff, meaning that there is a sharp difference in school attainment between the children who
become eligible for schooling (turn seven years old) on the year of school opening and the children
who become eligible one year before schooling opening.
It turns out that we do not see a discontinuity if we graph the schooling outcomes over the
running variable values, and this holds for all education measures: having some schooling, having
completed primary school, having some secondary or the education level. This might be due
to the catching-up of the children who were 8 or 9 when the school was established in their
village and may have benefited from this increased access to school. We might then withdraw
the partially treated from the analysis but were already working with a small sample as there are
71 observations at the cutoff year, and about 37 observations on average (median of 31) for each
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value of the running variable, in the pooled sample, men and women included.
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Appendix D: OLS and reduced-form equations

Table D1: Correlation between measures of political engagement and schooling outcomes, by
gender

1. Index, men sample
1. Index, women sample
2. Voting, men sample
2. Voting, women sample
3. Joining issue, men sample
3. Joining issue, women sample
4. Part. meeting, men sample
4. Part. meeting, women sample
5. Part. in community group, men sample
5. Part. in community group, women sample

(1)
Some
education

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

-0.031
(0.041)
-0.202∗∗∗
(0.052)
-0.052∗∗∗
(0.019)
-0.117∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.006
(0.020)
-0.043∗∗
(0.022)
-0.009
(0.018)
-0.066∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.046∗
(0.024)
-0.020
(0.026)

-0.074
(0.047)
-0.214∗∗∗
(0.062)
-0.056∗∗
(0.022)
-0.122∗∗∗
(0.028)
-0.012
(0.022)
-0.042∗
(0.025)
-0.034∗
(0.020)
-0.089∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.028
(0.027)
-0.071∗∗
(0.030)

-0.099∗
(0.056)
-0.288∗∗∗
(0.068)
-0.064∗∗
(0.025)
-0.127∗∗∗
(0.030)
-0.021
(0.026)
-0.070∗∗
(0.028)
-0.046∗
(0.023)
-0.125∗∗∗
(0.029)
-0.020
(0.029)
-0.105∗∗∗
(0.033)

-0.023
(0.015)
-0.082∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.021∗∗∗
(0.007)
-0.047∗∗∗
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.015∗
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.032∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.018∗
(0.010)

Notes: Dependent variable is alternatively index of political engagement, or each of the four dummy variables
(whether voted in the prior election, whether participated in a meeting, whether joined with others to raise an
issue, and whether a member of a community group (only available for rounds 4-7)). Data on the outcome is from
the Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds. Coefficients of the
education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level, are in parentheses. All
specifications include a dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular uprising leading to
democratic transition), and are estimated with Stata command reghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.
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Table D2: Reduced form equation on index of political engagement, with the instrumental variables
Sample

(1)
Whole

(2)
Men

(3)
Women

Panel A: IV dummy variable of school in village
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.239∗∗∗
(0.035)
-0.038
(0.038)
-0.017
(0.041)

-0.231∗∗∗
(0.044)
-0.069
(0.047)
-0.091∗
(0.052)

-0.175∗∗∗
(0.049)
-0.014
(0.055)
0.017
(0.059)

Panel B: IV number of schools weighted by proximity
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.077∗∗∗
(0.010)
-0.028∗∗∗
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.013)

-0.078∗∗∗
(0.017)
-0.033∗∗
(0.015)
-0.034∗
(0.019)

-0.063∗∗∗
(0.013)
-0.029∗
(0.016)
-0.003
(0.023)

Notes: Dependent variable is index of political engagement, the sum of three dummy variables (whether voted in
the prior election, whether participated in a meeting, and whether joined with others to raise an issue). Data on
the outcome is from the Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, various rounds.
Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level, are in
parentheses. All specifications include a dummy variable for post-2014 survey rounds (after popular uprising
leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command reghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.

Appendix E: Instrumental variable regressions using proximity to school
as instrumental variable

Table E1: Effects of education on the four measures of political engagement, with various measures
of education, and with weighted number of schools when school eligible as instrumental variable,
men sample

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Voted in the previous election
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.342∗∗∗
(0.059)
0.092
(0.064)
0.051
(0.092)

-0.403∗∗∗
(0.071)
0.108
(0.078)
0.059
(0.110)

-0.449∗∗∗
(0.082)
0.149
(0.106)
0.080
(0.145)

-0.115∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.032
(0.023)
0.017
(0.032)

Panel B: Joined with others to raise an issue
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.230∗∗∗
(0.072)
-0.048
(0.091)
0.031
(0.106)

-0.265∗∗∗
(0.086)
-0.057
(0.108)
0.037
(0.124)

-0.294∗∗∗
(0.096)
-0.076
(0.145)
0.048
(0.161)

-0.077∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.017
(0.032)
0.011
(0.036)

Panel C: Member of a community group
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.295∗∗∗
(0.080)
-0.169
(0.104)
-0.264∗
(0.143)

-0.343∗∗∗
(0.095)
-0.212
(0.132)
-0.320∗
(0.179)

-0.380∗∗∗
(0.105)
-0.292
(0.186)
-0.438∗
(0.257)

-0.101∗∗∗
(0.028)
-0.063
(0.039)
-0.096∗
(0.053)

Panel D: Participated in a meeting
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.300∗∗∗
(0.063)
-0.145∗
(0.077)
-0.219∗∗
(0.109)

-0.349∗∗∗
(0.076)
-0.177∗
(0.092)
-0.257∗∗
(0.126)

-0.385∗∗∗
(0.085)
-0.232∗
(0.125)
-0.334∗
(0.171)

-0.101∗∗∗
(0.022)
-0.052∗
(0.027)
-0.076∗∗
(0.038)

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, five rounds (except in Panel C, rounds
4-7). Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level,
are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.
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Table E2: Effects of education on the four measures of political engagement, with various measures
of education, and with weighted number of schools when school eligible as instrumental variable,
women sample

Education measure

(1)
Some
schooling

(2)
Completed
primary

(3)
Some
secondary

(4)
Education
attainment

Panel A: Voted in the previous election
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.250∗∗∗
(0.078)
0.103
(0.100)
0.080
(0.141)

-0.320∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.136
(0.131)
0.111
(0.199)

-0.380∗∗∗
(0.121)
0.168
(0.163)
0.164
(0.295)

-0.097∗∗∗
(0.030)
0.042
(0.040)
0.035
(0.062)

Panel B: Joined with others to raise an issue
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.367∗∗∗
(0.077)
-0.091
(0.110)
-0.013
(0.170)

-0.459∗∗∗
(0.097)
-0.119
(0.144)
-0.019
(0.237)

-0.543∗∗∗
(0.116)
-0.149
(0.180)
-0.028
(0.352)

-0.141∗∗∗
(0.030)
-0.037
(0.044)
-0.006
(0.074)

Panel C: Member of a community group
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.312∗∗∗
(0.097)
-0.083
(0.136)
-0.010
(0.205)

-0.396∗∗∗
(0.123)
-0.110
(0.180)
-0.013
(0.263)

-0.449∗∗∗
(0.138)
-0.133
(0.216)
-0.018
(0.382)

-0.120∗∗∗
(0.038)
-0.033
(0.055)
-0.004
(0.086)

Panel D: Participated in a meeting
No cohort or locality controls
Birth year, province
5-year cohort, commune

-0.381∗∗∗
(0.080)
-0.095
(0.111)
0.104
(0.165)

-0.477∗∗∗
(0.100)
-0.124
(0.145)
0.145
(0.232)

-0.565∗∗∗
(0.118)
-0.154
(0.179)
0.214
(0.349)

-0.147∗∗∗
(0.031)
-0.038
(0.044)
0.045
(0.072)

Notes: Afrobarometer Burkina Faso data, rural residents born after 1950, five rounds (except in Panel C, rounds
4-7). Coefficients of the education measure are reported and their standard errors, clustered at the village level,
are in parentheses. All specifications include dummy variable for two post-2014 survey rounds (after popular
uprising leading to democratic transition), and birth cohort and geographic dummy variables as indicated, and are
estimated with Stata command ivreghdfe. * p <0.10,** p <0.05,*** p <0.01.
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Appendix F: Power
We may evaluate the power of the estimation approach for the four separate components on the
index of political engagement using the R package ivmodel, developed by Kang et al. (2021), that
implements the power formula developed by Freeman, Cowling, and Schooling (2013). Figure F1
shows the calculated power for specifications with the binary outcome variable indicating whether
the person participated in a meeting. Power is calculated for the three education indicators
considered (some schooling, completed primary, and education level), with whether there was a
school in the village at the time the person was eligible for school as the instrumental variable,
and different sets of control variables, as indicated. The coefficients (effects) considered are in the
range of those estimated in Tables 7 and 8. These are about -0.3 for the index of schooling level.
The different effect sizes (here not standardized, but rather the magnitude of the coefficient)
are on the x-axes, and the power is indicated on the y-axis. The power is calculated for the menonly sample, with about 2,100 observations. The power calculations for the other components
(whether voted, and whether joined with others to discuss an issue) are also presented, as well as
for whether member of a community group (available for rounds 4-7 only, and so with a smaller
sample size).
As can be seen, the estimations appear to be well-powered on the whole, with power for
coefficients of -0.3 being either 80% or higher for many specifications with some schooling or
the education level as explanatory variable, but less often for the variable of whether completed
primary schooling, as there is less variation in that indicator relative to the other two schooling
indicators.

Figure F1: Power calculations for different education variables (endogenous) using schooling access
as instrument and outcome variable whether participated in a meeting
Notes: Power calculated under various effect sizes using R package ivmodel developed by Kang et
al. (2021), using Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents born after 1950, men only, sample
size about 2,100.
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Figure F2: Power calculations for different education variables (endogenous) using schooling access
as instrument and outcome variable is a member of a community group
Notes: Power calculated under various effect sizes using R package ivmodel developed by Kang et
al. (2021), using Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents born after 1950, men only, sample
size about 1,650.

Figure F3: Power calculations for different education variables (endogenous) using schooling access
as instrument and outcome variable whether voted
Notes: Power calculated under various effect sizes using R package ivmodel developed by Kang et
al. (2021), using Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents born after 1950, men only, sample
size about 2,100.
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Figure F4: Power calculations for different education variables (endogenous) using schooling access
as instrument and outcome variable whether joined with others to discuss an issue
Notes: Power calculated under various effect sizes using R package ivmodel developed by Kang et
al. (2021), using Afrobarometer data, various rounds, rural residents born after 1950, men only, sample
size about 2,100.
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